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Analyses of the role of government in regulating the labour market tend to focus on the 
content and consequences of government policies and the legal framework within which 
employment relationships are established. Labour administration has tended to receive much 
less attention, yet well-resourced and well-managed public bodies are of critical importance 
if labour market challenges are to be addressed and the effectiveness of policy enhanced.  
The aims of this report are to take stock of recent developments in labour administration and 
highlight some of the ways in which national governments have sought to improve the 
functioning of their national systems of labour administration. Over the past two decades, 
substantial changes have taken place in the organization of national labour administration 
systems and the principles according to which they are managed. Reforms have been 
initiated so as to support new labour, employment and social protection policies and enhance 
the effectiveness of service delivery in these areas. The reforms have also taken place as a 
consequence of attempts by national governments to improve performance, transparency and 
accountability within the public sector. The widespread tightening of public finances that 
followed the economic crisis that began in 2008 has provided added impetus to these efforts. 
Labour administration bodies in many countries have experienced reductions in their 
budgets and therefore their capacity. Austerity has been accompanied by an even greater 
emphasis on ‘efficiency savings’.  
Many ministries and associated agencies are therefore confronted with the challenge of 
trying to achieve ‘more’ for ‘less’, which increases further the need for effective 
management practices. Drawing on research conducted for the ILO and contributions to the 
wider literature relating to public administration, labour policy and employment relations, 
this report describes and compares approaches to the management of labour administration 
in different countries and highlights innovative practices. Section 2 of the report describes a 
number of recent reforms and their drivers. The remaining sections of the report cover six 
core issues: planning methods and the use of data; the coordination of labour administration 
activities; the development of partnerships; the use of ICT, methods of performance 
management; and the extension of labour administration to the informal economy.  
Sections 3 and 4 present and discuss examples of how governments and labour ministries in 
different countries approach planning, performance management and the collection and use 
of data. Effective planning and performance management processes, underpinned by 
accurate and reliable data, can help to ensure that the allocation of resources supports the 
priorities of governments and ministries and is linked to a programme of actions that can be 
evaluated. As Section 5 of the report makes clear, the successful delivery of programmes    is 
also likely to require a coordinated effort by a number of ministries and associated agencies 
and the report provides a number of examples of efforts to enhance coordination and 
cooperation within national labour administration systems. The importance of coordination 
has increased as a consequence of steps taken by national governments to involve the private 
and ‘third’ sectors in the delivery of services, most notably in relation to employment 
services. Furthermore, employers’ organizations, trade unions and civil society 
organizations are often involved in national systems of labour administration, providing 
advice and sometimes shouldering responsibilities relating to the governance of labour 
administration bodies or service provision. Labour administration bodies therefore have to 
coordinate not only with each other and with other public bodies, but also with a range of 
external stakeholders. Ensuring effectiveness in relation to the delivery of labour policies 
may therefore require the formation of partnerships, which may vary in terms of their 
formality and lifespan but which nevertheless need to be robust. Section 6 of the report 
examines a number of recent attempts to develop such partnerships. 
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Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has provided one means by which 
labour administration bodies can attempt to reduce costs while also enhancing their 
effectiveness. ICT has enabled new approaches to service delivery and has helped labour 
administration bodies to improve the coordination of their respective responsibilities. As 
discussed in Section 7 of the report, ICT-related reforms have been widespread in recent 
years and have affected management processes, working practices and service delivery. 
The final substantive issue covered by the report is the informal economy. The informal 
economy remains a substantial source of employment in many countries and in some 
developing countries; a majority of workers are employed informally. In recent years, 
several countries have stepped up their efforts to encourage transitions for the formal 
economy and extend the regulatory scope of labour administration in order to better protect 
informally employed workers. Section 8 of the report emphasizes the importance of good 
quality data, ICT and inter-agency coordination in efforts to address the challenges presented 
by the informal economy. The final section of the report, Section 9, draws together the 




2. Important recent administrative reforms 
2.1 Reforms related to austerity 
Following the eruption of the financial crisis in 2008 governments in many countries 
eventually came to impose reductions in public spending in an effort to reduce public 
deficits. The imposition of ‘austerity’ has been a driver of administrative reforms in a number 
of countries.  
For example, the UK government has developed a Civil Service Reform Plan, which 
represents an attempt to deal with the consequences of government spending cuts. A key 
concern is to increase productivity, particularly in respect of operational delivery (e.g. 
administering pensions and benefit systems). Change is being driven through the main 
delivery departments, including the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). Reforms are focusing on encouraging 
innovations in service delivery, increasing efficiency through using IT, improving cross-
departmental working, and implementing methods to ensure continuous improvement. The 
government has insisted that productivity in operational delivery should match the best that 
the private sector can offer. It has also encouraged greater private sector involvement in 
operational delivery, for example public-private partnerships (Heyes and Hastings 2015). 
Austerity in Ireland has led to a restructuring of government departments and associated 
agencies, with a view to securing cost savings. In terms of labour administration, the 
departments which have undertaken the greatest restructuring include Social Protection and 
the related Public Employment Services (PES) which are tasked with processing a growing 
number of unemployed under tighter budgetary constraints. In addition, Ireland’s National 
Employment Rights Authority (NERA) has faced additional staffing and budgetary 
constraints since the financial crash. 
Funding cuts can hinder the ability of labour administration bodies to perform their tasks 
effectively. For example, the US Department of Labour (USDOL) is concerned that 
declining state budgets and staffing over time have hampered the ability of individual states 
to achieve the USDOL’s objectives in respect of unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation programs, minimum wages, overtime and family leave (Heinrich and King 
2015: 44).  
Some labour administration bodies have taken steps to cope with funding cuts by targeting 
their activities so as to make the most effective use of the resources available to them. For 
example, the UK’s Health & Safety Executive’s (HSE) budget was cut by 35 per cent during 
the 2010-2015 Spending Review period. The HSE responded by focusing its severely 
diminished resources on high-risk sectors and businesses while attempting to make internal 
cost savings and ‘efficiency improvements’ and implementing a new fees regime. Safety 
campaigners and trade unions, however, are concerned that the reduction in resources, 
capacity and proactive inspections will encourage many more employers to adopt a 
complacent attitude to health and safety at work, resulting in a higher incidence of accidents, 
fatalities and illnesses.  
Austerity has also given additional impetus to governments’ efforts to streamline regulation 
and develop alternative regulatory strategies. In some countries government have sought to 
reduce supposed regulatory ‘burdens’ on employers. This has been the case in the UK, where 
a ‘Red Tape Challenge’ initiative has been underway since 2010 with the aim of reducing 
the amount of regulation in the UK economy (Heyes and Hastings 2015), and also in Ireland, 




2.2 Efforts to improve effectiveness and address challenges 
Some reform programmes have been driven by a recognition of deficiencies in existing 
approaches, sometimes resulting from changes in conditions in the economy and labour 
market.  
The US provides a good illustration (Heinrich and King 2015: 25-30). Over the past three 
years there has been a substantial change in the approach to regulation taken by the 
USDOL’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD). The U.S. Government Accountability Office 
conducted several investigations that documented enforcement shortcomings of the WHD 
during the G.W. Bush Administration (e.g., USGAO, 2008). Attempts to address these 
shortcomings have been stepped up since the appointment of Professor David Weil as WHD 
Administrator in 2014. The USDOL’s regulatory approach now comprises a combination of 
advice and education for employers and workers, strategic targeting of particular sectors, 
with a particular concern to target low-wage sectors and sectors with high rates of non-
compliance, and the use of social media in an effort to achieve ‘ripple effects’ that influence 
the behaviour of firms beyond those that have been directly subject to WHD actions 
(Heinrich and King 2015). The USDOL has characterised its new approach as involving a 
shift from ‘catch me if you can’ to ‘Plan/Prevent/Protect’. 1 Employers and other regulated 
entities are required to create a plan for ‘identifying and remediating risks of legal violations 
and other risks to workers’, to provide employees with opportunities to be involved in the 
development of the plans and to make plans available to workers. Regulated entities are also 
required to ensure that plans are implemented in a way that ensures no legal violations. The 
‘protection’ element places an obligation on employers to ensure that the plan does protect 
workers and emphasizes that action will be taken against employers who are found to be 
non-compliant. 
In Germany, skills shortage has emerged as a serious concern for policy makers. Employers 
have been receiving too few applications from qualified applicants in a context of falling 
unemployment. The PES has responded by establishing four courses of action: (1) rather 
than focusing on applicants’ deficits, PES staff are being trained to identify what 
competences an applicant has and what PES programmes are available to make a candidate 
more ‘employable’; (2) the PES may encourage employers to take on ‘weaker’ applicants or 
consider applicants from outside Germany (the PES has set up a new service to help with 
international recruitment, the ZAV); (3) PES staff assess whether firms have fully exploited 
their internal capacities (e.g. whether incumbent employees might be able to upgrade their 
skills and fill skills gaps); and (4) PES staff encourage firms to think about how they 
encourage employees to remain with the firm (e.g. through more flexible working times, 
measures to improve work-life balance etc.). However, the PES has found that many 
employers prefer to continue with their established practices, resulting in an under-utilization 
of available measures and a continuing reluctance to consider foreign and older workers 
(Weishaupt 2015). 
In the EU and elsewhere, migration has become a more substantial policy concern in recent 
years. This issue has influenced labour inspection activities in many countries. In the UK, a 
Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) was created in 2006 to regulate sectors in which 
large number of migrants are employed (this is discussed further in Section 8). In Spain, a 
restructuring of ministries in 2008 led to the creation of a Ministry of Labour and 
Immigration, responsible for the proposal and implementation of government policies on 
labour, management and regulation of employment and social security, as well as the 
development of the Government's policy relating to foreign nationals, immigration and 
emigration (Daza 2015: 16).  
 
1  http://www.dol.gov/regulations/2010RegNarrative.htm 
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The creation of the UK’s GLA represents an attempt to improve the enforcement of labour 
standards via inspection activities. Other countries have also taken steps to enhance the 
enforcement of labour standards. A key development in South Africa has been a shift from 
generalist labour inspectors to specialist inspector (Cameron 2015: 15). Since 2012, the 
policy has been to appoint specialist labour inspectors in the provinces who are experts in 
particular areas (such as Electrical, Health and Safety, Construction and Explosives). 
Specialisation has improved the effectiveness of provisional offices, although South Africa 
continues to lack a sufficient number of inspectors.  
Some countries have also taken steps to improve dialogue with social partners. For example, 
in Spain in 2009 an administrative structure entitled the Cabinet for the Social Dialogue was 
created, to promote, coordinate and monitor social dialogue, which was considered one of 
the major strategic thrusts of Government action (Daza 2015: 16). Relations with the social 
partners are covered in greater depth in Section 6, which is concerned with ‘Partnerships’ in 




3. Planning and data 
A pre-requisite of labour administration effectiveness is the existence of clear and achievable 
plans that show how government and Ministry objectives are to be achieved. A robust 
planning process is required that establishes the actions that need to be taken and how they 
will be taken. The planning process is bound up with the process of determining budget 
allocations. It has become a common practice for countries to attempt to link decisions 
relating to the allocation of public funds to the performance of public administration bodies. 
However, performance-informed budgeting is difficult to carry out in practice. Governments 
require clear measures of performance and cost and need to ensure that there are incentives 
to relate information about performance to decisions in respect of budgets (Holton and Joyce 
2012: 427). In order to develop appropriate plans, policy makers require accurate and reliable 
information about the state of the labour market and the performance of labour market 
programmes. It has become common for policy makers to emphasize the importance of 
‘evidence-based’ policy making, which implies that the development of policy and 
programme content should be informed by information about what policies ‘work’ in 
practice.  
The expectation is that new initiatives should be grounded in reliable, clear and 
comprehensive research evidence. Ministries should calculate the anticipated impact of 
proposed policies, use this information when selecting from a range of possible alternatives, 
and subject policies and programmes to rigorous processes of evaluation. As is the case with 
performance-oriented planning and budgeting, evidence-based policy making is often 
difficult to achieve in practice. While research may influence policy-making, it is ‘not always 
influential [and may be] supplanted by the powerful political forces of inertia, expediency, 
ideology and finance’ (Walker 2000: 62-3). The implication is that ‘evidence-based policy 
making’ may be undermined. For example, governments may favour a lower cost 
programme over a higher-cost programme, even though the evidence suggests that the latter 
might be more effective. These difficulties notwithstanding, the evidence below suggests 
that many governments have taken steps to enhance the evidence base upon which policies 
and programmes are developed.   
3.1 Planning processes 
Planning processes typically involve a number of steps, through which plans are developed 
and refined. The following example, which is from South Africa, provides an illustration of 




Example 1. The planning process in South Africa 
In South Africa the government has established 12 high level aims or ‘outcomes’, such as achieving decent 
employment through inclusive economic growth. The Department of Labour’s programme is intended to meet 
three of the outcomes. The ministry develops a five-year action programme with a set of linked targets. A 
performance agreement is then signed by the President. The planning cycle then begins within the department 
and comprises the following steps:  
(i) Annual Evaluation workshop, which takes place in June/July and is dedicated to evaluating the 
previous financial year and considering priorities and budget requirements. This process is the basis 
for the development of an Annual Performance Plan, which is submitted to the National Treasury at 
the end of August.  
(ii) A strategic planning consultation process takes places from August to the end of November. The 
previous years’ performance is reviewed and medium term strategic objectives, key deliverables and 
budgets are considered.  
(iii) A Mid-Term Review and Planning workshop, which takes place in October/November. Mid-term 
progress is reviewed and the agreed priorities of the Annual Evaluation are developed into a concrete 
programme of action (Annual Performance Plan), taking into account the possible budget allocations 
for the following year.  
(iv) Branches of the Department have Strategic Planning sessions to finalise agreed priorities of the annual 
evaluation and mid-term review and formulate annual work plans   
(v) The Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan (APP) are finalised, in line with allocated funds. This 
leads to agreed targets and resource allocations between the Director General, Branch Heads and the 
Chief Operating Officer/Chief Directors: Provincial Operations by the end of January. The APP informs 
the DG’s performance agreement (DoL Integrated work plan), and is cascaded down to branches and 
provincial operations workplans/performance agreements.    
(vi) The final step is the approval of the strategic plan and the APP and tabling to Parliament by the Minister 
in March every year  
Source: Cameron (2015: 17-18). 
The US provides another example of a country with a well thought-through approach to 
planning. The guiding framework for planning in respect of federally-funded programmes 
in the U.S. was established under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 
The Act requires that each department prepare a strategic plan and update it at least every 
three years (Heinrich and King 2015: 33-34). The process is overseen by the White House’s 
Office of Management and Budget. The current state plans in relation to the ‘workforce 
investment’ cover the years 2012-2016 and are publicly accessible through the USDOL’s 
Employment and Training Administration (ETA) website. 2 Each state plan must include:  
1. A strategic plan. This section normally starts by setting out the Governor’s ambitions 
for the state economy and goals for the workforce development system. States are 
required to include an analysis of the state economy and workforce needs and skills, 
which informs how the state will align policy, operations and administrative systems to 
meet the identified needs. The Employment and Training Administration within the 
USDOL also encourages states to take into consideration the ETA’s current policy 
priorities when developing their state plans. The priorities are communicated to states 
via Training and Employment Guidance Letters (TEGLs).  The policy priorities tend to 
reflect the broader objectives of the executive administration, such as the Obama 
administration’s emphasis on the use of evidence-based practice and a new ‘dual 
customer’ focus. The purpose of the latter is to achieve a better match between 
employment and training measures directed at the unemployed and employers’ skills 
needs (Heinrich and King: 2015: 34-35).   
 
2  http://www.doleta.gov/performance/results/AnnualReports/annual_report.cfm. 
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2. An operational plan. The operational plan describes how each program under the 
Workforce Investment Act will align with and implement the ambition and strategies set 
out in the strategic plan section. It should include information about how different 
participant subgroups will be served by the various programmes. Although the state 
plans cover a five-year timeframe, performance goals are negotiated with the USDOL 
on an annual basis, which enables states to take into consideration the latest data on 
changing economic conditions and to use them in setting more realistic targets (Heinrich 
and King 2015: 34) 
3. ‘Assurances’. These are declarations by the state that its key obligations under the law 
have been met.   
The Ministry of Labour and Employment in India also delivers against periodic strategic 
plans (Sarkar, 2015). Plans have included new welfare and labour policies including, for 
example, the Skills Development Mission (an umbrella scheme with several components), a 
programme for enhancing Social Security for Unorganized workers (including Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana, RSBY) and the National Child Labour Project (NCLP). 
3.2 Types and sources of data 
It is vital that labour ministries have ready access to accurate and reliable information about 
the labour market and the maintenance of labour standards. It is therefore important that 
governments conduct regular nationally representative surveys that capture information 
about matters such as employment, unemployment, wages, hours of work and vocational 
education and training. For example, in Sri Lanka, the Statistics Division of the Ministry of 
Labour and Labour Relations conducts two annual postal surveys: an annual jobs and 
employments survey; and a survey on normal earnings and working hours. The results of the 
surveys are published by the Publication Division in three volumes (an annual jobs and 
employment survey; labour statistics, and a report on normal earnings and working hours. 
In addition, the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLF) conducted by the Department of 
Census and Statistics (DCS) provides detailed information on the labour force, employment, 
unemployment and underemployment based on a representative sample of the population of 
households nationwide. The less frequent Census of Population and the Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey, also conducted by DCS, provide information about population, 
labour force, income and expenditure patterns. The databases of the DCS are fully 
computerized and readily available for analysis by a wide range of user groups. (Chandrasiri 
and Gunatilaka 2015: 48). 
In developing policies in a particular domain, ministries will often draw on a variety of 
official data sources. For example, the German government’s skills agenda is systematically 
supported by statistical data, including labor market data (prepared by the PES), population 
survey data, and firm survey data. The PES data are used to produce regular ‘skills bottleneck 
reports’, which analyze job vacancies by occupation on a monthly basis. The PES also 
provides a wide variety of additional analyses on issues ranging from gender to age to 
regional disparities. Labor market and skills monitoring occurs mainly through two outlets: 
Labor Market Monitor (Arbeitsmarktmonitor) and the annual Progress Reports 
(Fortschrittsberichte) (Weishaupt 2015). Labour market monitoring has been strengthened 




Example 2: The German Labor Market Monitor (AM-Monitor) 
The AM-Monitor was first developed to provide a comprehensive labor market assessment at both regional 
and sectoral levels. The data are prepared in an interactive process, whereby the central statistical unit of the 
PES collects relevant statistical data from various official sources (e.g. PES internal statistics, statistics from 
Federal Statistical Office or Eurostat) and prepares them for dissemination. In a second step, the local PES offices 
evaluate the data by discussing them with relevant stakeholders at the local level (e.g. employer and business 
associations, chambers, trade unions, banks). After discussing and correcting the data, the information is then 
passed back to the central unit, which prepares the data for publication in the AM-Monitor. The data are updated 
on a regular basis. Every six months, a forecasting report is issued which represents a very important tool to 
assess regional development. 
The AM-Monitor was updated in 2011 when the regional and sectoral data were further broken down by 
occupations. This more fine-tuned presentation of data allows for specific ‘bottleneck analysis’ of the labor market, 
highlighting specific skills needs at the local level. These data are actively used by the Federal Ministry for Labor 
and Social Affairs, the Länder governments as well as other (regional) stakeholders.  
The AM-Monitor also serves as a communication and networking platform, where actors can post ‘good 
practice’ examples, engage in collaborative activities, post and advertise relevant events, or make new contacts. 
The AM-Monitor includes about 16,000 members. Approximately half are PES staff and related experts. The other 
half are stakeholders, such as employers, trade unions, chambers etc. How important this networking function is 
remains unclear and it varies greatly across actors.   
Source: Weishaupt 2015  
In developing policies and plans, governments draw on information from three main sources: 
firstly, information provided by internal researchers; secondly, information provided by 
independent or semi-independent research bodies that are linked to government departments; 
and finally, independent research institutes, including universities and research consultants.  
Universities and research consultancies can be commissioned to undertake research to meet 
objectives that are set by the body that is commissioning the research. In India, the Ministry 
of Labour and Employment provides grants to Research and Academic Institutions and 
Voluntary Organizations to assist data generation and related research on labour matters 
(Sarkar 2015). There are a number of potential advantages that may arise from 
commissioning research. For example, external experts might have knowledge and skills 
that are not available within government. They may also have ideas that challenge 
established orthodoxies within government and might help policy makers think differently, 
and perhaps more creatively, about policy. Most importantly, policy and programme 
evaluations that are independent of government can help governments to defuse opposition 
to policies that are politically contested (assuming that the evidence is favourable). For 
example, in 2009, the coalition agreement between the Christina Democrats and Liberals in 
Germany included a commitment to evaluate the impact of sectoral minimum wages, on the 
basis of which the government would decide whether the sectoral minimum wages should 
be abolished. The evaluations, which were conducted by leading German research institutes, 
found that there had been no negative effects on employment and the sectoral minimum 
wages were retained (Weishaupt 2015). The creation in the UK of an independent Low Pay 
Commission in 1998, which drew on independent studies to demonstrate that the National 
Minimum Wage had not destroyed jobs, had a similar effect. 
Research institutes that are linked to Ministries can augment their capacity and, like 
university researchers and consultants, may have the virtue of being independent. 
Importantly, they may also be able to respond relatively rapidly to requests for information. 
An example of a country in which research institutes are linked to the Ministry is provided 
by the Czech Republic. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) has a Labour 
Market Concepts and Strategies Department, which makes use of statistics provided by the 
Czech Statistical Office (CSO), particularly Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. For deep and 
systematic analyses that are beyond its internal research capability, however, MoLSA is able 
to call on the services of two research institutes: the Research Institute for Labour and Social 
Affairs (RILSA) and the Occupational Safety Research Institute (OSRI). The institutes were 
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founded by MoLSA and originally entirely funded by government subsidies. Since 2010, 
however, state funding has been cut and the research institutes have had to make up the short 
fall in their budgets via grant-based activities and cost-cutting measures (Lehmann and 
Kyzlinková 2015: 22-23). 
A further example is provided by Spain, where planning is influenced by data produced by 
observatories (Daza 2015: 27). The two main observatories for labour matters are: 
i. The State Observatory of Working Conditions (OEST), which provides high quality 
information on occupational health. It periodically publishes a detailed analysis of 
accidents in the workplace that enables the effective targeting of preventive policies 
and their monitoring and assessment, providing policy makers with a necessary tool 
to achieve institutional goals. 
ii. The Occupation Observatory of the Public State Employment Service, which is a 
technical body of the PES and is responsible for analysing labour market trends and 
challenges. It has a single network throughout the country. Its studies are used to 
establish priorities in respect of training activities. The Occupation Observatory relies 
on a network of professionals distributed throughout the country. Work is coordinated 
through working groups that focus on different activities and are responsible for their 
quality. The Observatory publishes monthly, quarterly and annual reports that cover 
key labour market issues, including employment, skills and mobility. 
3.3 Improving the evidence base 
The value of official statistics depends on the ability of governments to ensure that data 
collection and analysis is undertaken to the highest possible standards. Where lapses are 
detected, it is important that action is taken to address them. 
A good example is provided by the US, where state workforce investment agencies are 
required to maintain standardised records of individuals who receive services or benefits 
from certain programmes. However, there have been inconsistencies across states in terms 
of how data are recorded and managed. The limitations of the existing workforce 
development data systems led in 2010 to a new Workforce Data Quality Initiative (WDQI), 
which is administered by USDOL and provides grants to states to facilitate improvements 
in their data systems. A similar scheme is administered by the US Department of Education. 
Together, these schemes are intended to support the development and improvement of state 
education and workforce longitudinal databases, the integration of education and workforce 
data, and their quality and breadth. They are also intended to help citizens select education 
and training programmes that best suit their needs. Thus, some states have developed 
dashboards that provide unemployed workers with easy-to access information about services 
(Heinrich and King 2015: 39-40). 
The WDQI has given rise to an initiative by the US National Skills Council, which is helping 
selected state to develop supply-demand analysis, dashboards and career pathway evaluators 
in an effort to demonstrate how state officials and other policy leaders can use these data 
tools to make more informed decisions about targeting state and federal resources on the 
most effective programme combinations for unemployed workers, particularly those with 
low skills (Heinrich and King 2015: 40). 
It is also important that those who use data are aware of all relevant sources and have access 
to up-to-date and comprehensive information relating to the policies and programmes for 
which they are responsible. In the UK, a major initiative has been launched to improve the 
evidence base and improve policy makers’ understanding of the relative effectiveness of 
different policy measures. It is entitled ‘What Works’ and is delivered by independent 
centres. It has also inspired the Department of Work and Pensions to establish a ‘What 
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Works, Evidence & Narratives’ unit within the DWP to synthesise and share research 
evidence within the department. In addition, the Cabinet Secretary has commissioned a 
horizon scanning strategy review on the Future of Work. The Government Labour Market 
Board (discussed in Section 5) is supporting the group that is overseeing this initiative. It is 
being jointly coordinated by DWP and the Cabinet Office and different departments are 
looking at different issues relating to the Future of Work. For example, BIS and DWP 
together are looking at labour market participation 
Example 3: The UK’s ‘What Works’ initiative 
The UK’s ‘What Works’ initiative was developed as part of the Civil Service Reform Plan (see Section 2) 
and launched in March 2013. What Works aims to improve the way information is created, shared and used. The 
core principle is that decision-making should be based on the highest quality evidence concerning ‘what works’ 
and also ‘what does not work’ in relation to impact and cost effectiveness. The What Works Network comprises 
seven independent What Works Centres. The network is tasked with improving the evidence base by: ‘collating 
existing evidence on how effective policy programmes and practices are; producing high quality synthesis reports 
and systematic reviews in areas where they do not currently exist; assessing how effective policies and practices 
are against an agreed set of outcomes; sharing findings in an accessible way; and encouraging practitioners, 
commissioners and policy-makers to use these findings to inform their decisions’ 
3.4 Data and performance evaluation 
It is desirable that governments subject their policies to rigorous evaluations that are able to 
identify policy outcomes and provide policy makers with information that will enable them 
to determine whether a policy should be continued, refined or abandoned. This information 
will normally feed into performance management processes, discussed in Section 4. 
The measured performance of a labour administration body clearly depends on what is 
measured and how it is measured. The USDOL has recently changed its measures in an 
attempt to better capture the impact of its activities. The Strategic Plan for 2011-2016 
committed the USDOL to measuring outcomes of its programmes rather than simply 
programme outputs. In other words, rather than simply knowing how many people 
completed a programme, the USDOL undertook to measure what difference policies and 
programmes had made to people’s prospects and the behaviour of employers. The 
implications of this change in emphasis can be seen in relation to the WHD, which is 
committed to reporting on compliance levels for all regulated entities, continually evaluating 
whether strategies are leading to improved outcomes and using routine quantitative analysis 
and programme evaluation to assess the effectiveness of strategies (Heinrich and King 2015: 
41-43). 
Programme evaluation is a necessary activity for labour ministries, potentially enabling 
ministries and governments to determine whether programmes are effective, delivered well 
and represent good ‘value for money’. The impact of labour market programmes, such as 
employment schemes, are typically evaluated via econometric studies. However, the results 
from econometric analyses depend on the estimation methods that are used, which in turn 
reflect the decisions taken by those conducting the research. An example of the consequence 
this may have for policy is provided by Heinrich and King’s (2015: 13-14) discussion of 
evaluations of employment and training services in the US. An evaluation of the impact of 
the Job Training Partnership Act programmes in the late 1980s (Orr et al 1996) found that 
there were no statistically significant increases in earnings for young people who participated 
in the program. However, a subsequent re-analysis of the evaluation data by Heckman and 
Smith (2000), which adjusted for (among other things) the failure of the earlier study to 
account for treatment group dropouts and substitution by control group members, found that 
participation in the programme had a positive impact on earnings. 
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3.5 Trends and lessons learned 
Effective planning processes are essential if resources are to be used appropriately and linked 
to the priorities of the government and the associated objectives and targets of labour 
ministries and other labour administration bodies. It is important that the planning cycle be 
transparent, deadline-driven and allow for meaningful dialogue between finance ministries, 
labour ministries and associated bodies. Planning also requires the use of different types of 
data, including information about the past performance of labour administration bodies, 
emerging challenges and the state of the labour market. It is vital that information about 
labour market and employment relations matters be accurate, reliable and collected on a 
frequent and regular basis. Policies should be evaluated and politicians need to be cautious 
about making changes before policies have had time to ‘bed in’. In understanding what 
policies do or do not ‘work’ it is important to use different types of evidence and try to 
understand underlying causal mechanisms. It is also important that policy makers understand 
the limitations of data in terms of quality and coverage and that steps be taken to improve 
both. Some countries have attempted to identify and plug gaps in the evidence base and use 




4. Institutional performance management  
The implications of New Public Management (NPM) are now relatively well researched and 
understood. Across the corpus of research four ‘grand themes’ may be used to characterise 
NPM (O’Flynn, 2007, 354; Hughes, 2006):  
 The priority of management over administration (i.e. a focus on results and managerial 
responsibility over following instructions). 
 The belief that economic principles can assist public management (e.g. drawing on 
theories of competition and the firm). 
 The understanding that modern management theory and related practices (such as 
flexibility of staffing and organization) can enhance public management efficiency. 
 Service delivery is a priority for citizens.  
Alongside the development of NPM there has been a growing emphasis on perf rmance 
management and an associated increase in measurement techniques and systemic appraisal 
mechanisms, designed to evaluate both inputs and outcomes of public administration. The 
transition to proactive managerial models has encouraged a wealth of theoretical and cross-
national studies geared to evaluating these developments (Heinrich, 2002; Sanderson, 2001; 
Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Moynihan, 2006; O’Flynn, 2007).  
Despite the growth of new paradigms in public management (e.g. value driven approaches; 
ibid) the continued uptake of NPM may be linked to a series of inter-related pressures.  These 
include fiscal stresses/attendant budgetary concerns, a continued scepticism concerning the 
value of bureaucracy (often associated with needless waste and delays) and continued 
respect for private sector efficiencies (Hood 1991).  
The following section describes and evaluates existing systems of performance 
management, focusing on the extent to which performance management contributes to 
enhanced effectiveness of labour administration.  
4.1 Performance management systems operating across 
the whole of government 
In the U.S. the uptake of performance management systems has continued over the last 
decade under successive Labour Secretaries. For those services that have remained in-house, 
the government continues to embrace performance management systems across a range of 
labour administration services with a view to replicating private sector management 
techniques and their (perceived) efficiencies. This is evident in particular in the USDOL and 
attendant bodies such as the Wage and Hour Division, which have moved deliberately 
towards a greater use of performance metrics and more rigorous, systemic evaluation 
methods.   
The progressive embrace of performance management techniques in the U.S. is evidenced 
by the creation in 2010 of a Chief Evaluation Officer (CEO) role within the USDOL. The 
CEO independently coordinates, manages and implements the Department’s evaluation 
programme and collaborates with other federal departments and the wider research 
community.   
In the UK the main method of performance management has changed in recent years.  This 
has involved a shift from Public Service Agreements (PSAs) under Labour government 
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administrations (1997-2010) to ‘structural reform plans’ and the development of ‘transparency 
frameworks’ introduced by the Conservative government in 2010 (see Table 1). 









 3-years PSAs developed with the Treasury to set out objectives.  Intended to provided 
orientation and increase accountability.  
 
   PSAs were often cross-department to factor in distribution of responsibilities across 
BIS, DWP and other ministries. 
 
   Of the PSAs established for the 2008-11 period, for example, Department of Work and 
Pensions led on two: to ‘maximise employment opportunity for all’ and to ‘tackle 
poverty and promote greater independence and well-being in later life’ 
 
   Each PSA and strategic objective was underpinned by a number of performance 
indicators. 
 





 Emphasis on concrete actions linked to timescales (e.g. contracts issued per month), 
as opposed to broader targets (e.g. increasing the employment rate) 
   BIS’ structural reform plan contains aims and actions in relation to issues that are 
relevant to employment relations and labour administration (see Table 1 in the 
appendix of the UK report for information from the Department of Business, Innovation 
and Skills reform plan and actions since 2010). 
 
Conversely performance management in the Irish Government is conducted via a 
Performance Management and Development System (PMDS) which applies to all civil 
servants. This system is intended to provide a format for staff to plan work goals, identify 
learning and development needs, and to provide an opportunity for constructive feedback on 
performance.   
In contrast to this systematic approach to performance management, past reports on labour 
administration in South Africa (e.g. ILO, 2012) have suggested a somewhat haphazard 
approach to performance management and measurement. More recently, the department has 
progressively reduced the number of performance indicators from 133 to 48. The South 
African Government uses a Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan (APP) to help guide 
performance across the whole of government. The Department of Labour’s situational 
analysis of the performance environment is delivered in the Annual Performance Plan.   
In terms of specific systems, the South African government monitors employees through a 
Performance Review Process. Management Performance Assessment Tests (MPATs) are 
used to provide a comparative analysis of the 41 National Departments.  These are conducted 
by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. The MPAT rates 
performance according to four levels, ranging from non-compliance to full compliance with 
legal/regulatory requirements.  This system provides a measurement of all Key Performance 
scores for each government department.   
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By contrast the Spanish government has traditionally made less use of performance 
assessment compared to other OECD countries. Staff performance assessments have been 
criticised for relying on a narrow range of criteria which are not well linked to career 
advancement, remuneration and contract renewal. On the other hand, Spain makes more 
extensive use of performance-related pay (PRP) than most OECD countries. PRP is used for 
most employees and takes the form of one-off bonuses, representing a maximum of 6-10 
percent of base salary. 
In October 2012 the Spanish Commission for Public Administration Reform (CORA) 
provided an overall review of the public administration. This was intended to help implement 
efficiency assessment systems in certain State General Administration units across the board.  
More generally the proposal was intended to enhance the efficiency of government units and 
to reduce unused functional capacities, potentially through the use of goals/targets with 
reference to unit capacity. In India the most important performance management mechanism 
for the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE) is linked to the Result Framework 
Document (RFD) monitored by the Cabinet Secretariat. The objective of the RFD is to 
monitor the performances of ministries, with relative measures used to ascertain acceptable 
benchmark levels. Targets are also used to appraise state level units (e.g. programmes such 
as the National Child Labour Project) which are appraised in line with periodic reviews. 
Enforcement agencies also use a target system which includes a minimum number of 
inspections and prosecutions. Such evaluations are conducted internally at both centre and 
state level.   
4.2 The operation of performance management at different levels  
and relationships and linkages between these levels 
(e.g. individual, department, whole organization) 
The countries covered in this report reveal a range of approaches to managing performance, 
including orchestration of responsibilities at different levels. In Spain responsibility for 
performance management primarily resides with the Directorate General of the State Public 
Employment Service (SEPE), which delegates to General Sub Directorates in each area. 
SEPE then uses an EFQM Excellence Model for measuring the strengths and areas for 
improvement of the relevant organizations across all activities (a specific team in the Sub-
directorate is responsible for implementing and developing the plan).  
In South Africa the departmental objectives and targets are set in the Annual Performance 
Plan. The objectives and targets are then cascaded down to branches, Provincial Offices, 
Labour Centres and all teams and employees of the Department. In terms of target-setting, 
there is a growing degree of interaction between the Chief Directorate and the provinces, 
and indeed the Head Office can now link up with the provincial branch Heads to define the 
scope of work. This means that targets can be set at an organizational level vis-à-vis the 
national and provincial government levels (i.e. as opposed to just the national 
government/branch level). However, the setting of joint targets is not universal and is 
arguably confined to certain areas on the margins.   
In the USA, workforce programmes operate in a federal/state/local hierarchical structure, 
with goals and standards established by the USDOL and then further shaped and 
implemented by state and sub-state entities.  By contrast, wage and hours regulation is 
carried out at all levels – national, regional and district – mainly by federal employees who 
answer to the administrator for the WHD. Their work is augmented by the work of state 
wages and hours regulation staff, who, in recent years, have faced increasing workloads as 
state budgets have tightened. 
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4.3 Main performance indicators used at different levels  
In the US, the landmark Governance Performance and Results Act of 1993 facilitated a series 
of performance metrics which, by design, are meant to extend beyond specific programs.  
Their indicators and focus accordingly apply to broader areas of work within federal 
agencies. However the USDOL and the Wage and Hour Division have opted to craft 
measures that are relevant both at the level of broad goals and functions, as well as at the 
division level (the level where the WHD carries out its enforcement efforts). Strategic Goal 
3 in the current Department’s Strategic Plan is ‘to promote fair and high-quality work 
environments’. The Goal has accompanying strategic objectives, performance goals and 
measures. Examples of the key performance goals and measures in the 2014 USDOL 
Strategic Plan for the WHD include (pp. 51-54): 
Performance Goal WHD 3.2 - Increase corporate compliance with the Family and 
Medical Leave Act.  The primary measure is ‘percent of no-violation FMLA cases’.  
Compliance was almost 50 percent in FY 2011, but is expected to decline and has a 
target rate of just 38 percent in FY 2018, as a result of shifting to more agency-initiated 
cases. 
Performance Goal WHD 3.3 – Provide that vulnerable workers are employed in 
compliance and secure sustained and verifiable employer compliance, particularly 
among the most persistent violators.  Associated performance measures are: 
 Number of compliance actions 
 Percent of directed investigations (excludes conciliations) 
 Percent of directed investigations in priority industries 
 Percent of complaint investigations in priority industries 
 Percent of directed no violation cases 
 Percent of complaint no violation cases 
 Average age of Davis-Bacon wage rates (in months) for non-residential 
construction 
In the UK there are a range of specific performance management measures which apply to 
JobCentre Plus, the overall Work Programme and the conciliation and arbitration body 
ACAS. Since 2012, JobCentrePlus (the UK’s Public Employment Service) has operated ‘in-
house’ within the DWP (i.e. rather than operating as an independent Executive Agency).  
This development was associated with a change in the focus of performance management 
away from a ‘job outcome target points’ approach (focusing on certain numbers transitioned 
into work) towards an ‘expectations’ approach.  Expectations relate to off-flow rates from 
benefits in future time periods, based on estimates drawn from forecasts from the Office for 
Budgetary Responsibility.   
External providers are responsible for the management of the Work Programme (‘customers’ 
– i.e. unemployed workers - are referred to the Work Programme after 12 months without 
work).  Payment is based on results and partly regulated by the DWP’s analytical teams, 
which examine the progress of the Work Programme through assessing outcomes and the 
overall sustainability of jobs into which unemployed people are placed.  
ACAS also has its own management metrics, although these are agreed with BIS and 
mediated through service level agreements. As many issues are dealt with over the telephone, 
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the majority of metrics reflect typical call centre grading techniques (e.g. number of calls 
handled each week, number of cases resolved, number of hearing days saved).    
An example of performance management in the German PES (Bundesarbeitagentur – the 
main Germany PES/Federal Agency for Employment) is provided below:   
Example 4: Fine-tuning Performance Management 
The BA relies on a wide range of quantitative and (since 2014) qualitative performance targets and 
indicators. 3  In the recent past, the BA headquarters defined targets, based on mathematical calculations, and 
indicators, which were then assigned to local Employment Agencies via the Regional Directorates. Setting targets 
for each Employment Agency involved a process of negotiation. Since 2013, the target setting system has 
operated differently (and some indicators have also been adapted). Now, the local directors consult their team 
managers and – based on predictions of labor market developments, the current stock of clients and the strategic 
focus of the PES branch – define targets to be reached themselves. In some offices, this bottom-up process led 
to ambitious targets and no further target adjustments (negotiations) were needed; in other cases, the Regional 
Directorate negotiated with the manager to increase targets. Once targets are set, there are benchmarking 
exercises between PES offices, and performance is monitored on a monthly and assessed on a quarterly basis. 
Local Employment Agency managers receive performance-based bonuses on target achievement; good 
performance affects also their promotion prospects (European Commission (Nunn), 2012, 47). 
The performance management system is closely linked with new, high levels of local budgetary autonomy 
(but only in the context of Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) III). This is to say, since 2013 the local Employment Agencies 
estimate their ALMP budget needs in autumn for the following year, based on labor market situation forecasts, 
their customer bases and strategic foci. The Regional Directorates aggregate the budget requests for ALMP, who 
then inform the central PES. The BA decides on the overall budget for active measures, which is subsequently 
approved by the government. The Regional Directorates distribute the money to the local Employment Agencies. 
At local level, the Employment Agencies are free to use the ALMP budget as they choose, shift budget items if 
needed, and to assign staff to office locations and determine their roles (e.g. placement officer, employer contact 
etc.) 
4.4 Making Better Use of Performance Data 
In order to make better use of performance data the U.S. recently began (as of 2014) 
implementing its Open Government Plan (under the direction of the Office of Management 
and Budget).  Further to this, the Wage and Hour Division has begun posting planning data, 
performance information and supportive materials on the web for an audience that ranges 
from policymakers and program officials to employers and workers (its primary 
‘customers’), as well as researchers. However, the information posted remains somewhat 
limited at the time of writing and it remains an area in need of improvement.   
In South Africa, the verification of performance management data has recently come to be 
taken more seriously than was previously the case (Cameron 2015). For each quarterly 
performance indicator and target achieved/not achieved, there must be supporting 
documentation, which acts as evidence to verify the data. For each quarterly performance 
indicator and target not achieved, there must be a reason for deviation or variance. Equally, 
for audit purposes there must be evidence of why the performance indicator and target were 
not achieved (Department of Labour, 2015). At provincial level, staff who do not achieve 
targets are reported for ‘non-performance’ (Cameron, 2015).   
 
3 Qualitative targets include objectives such as, for instance, to better identify the needs of specific 
customers (e.g. small and medium sized enterprise, or youth unemployment with only a lowest-tier 
or without an educational degree, or long-term unemployment), while quantitative targets include a 
wide range of issues such as average duration on benefits, number of job placements, number of job-
to-job transitions, vacancy filling, UB processing times, and customer satisfaction (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit, 2013, 38). 
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4.5 Performance outcomes 
In the USA, the DOL has traditionally offered little guidance to One-Stop Centre staff on 
how to identify the needs of the broader target population or how to refer customers to the 
various levels of service in a cost-effective manner. The most basic “core” services under 
WIA - outreach, intake/assessment, job search assistance/placement and labour market 
information - were made available to the general public with no qualifying criteria/eligibility 
requirements. Furthermore, the DOL did not require monitoring and tracking of participants 
using the self-directed core services or non-WIA services at the One-Stop centers, (only 
those participants who receive substantial staff assistance in the WIA programs are tracked).  
In developing country, contexts there are a range of performance measurement concerns 
linked to the poor remuneration of staff and temptations to subvert performance standards 
on a range of metrics. In South Africa, an unintended impact of targeting labour inspection 
at provincial level (linked to non-performance) has been staff manipulation of data out of 
concerns for job security. More positively, in Sri Lanka the Labour Inspection and Systems 
Application (LISA, further discussed in Chapter 5) has been shown to provide timely and 
accurate information to the senior management of the Department of Labour, based on 
statistical reports generated through the system. LISA utilizes both technological 
advancements and a recruitment model based on the hiring of individual consultants (i.e. as 
opposed to hiring a firm). It supports on-site inspection processes in which authorized 
personnel can monitor the status of inspections as/when they occur. Further benefits of LISA 
include the ability to monitor individual staff performance through an evidence-based, 
transparent approach, which will ideally motivate staff to perform at the highest level.  
4.6 Persistent challenges in ‘developing’ countries 
In South Africa, Director General Thobile Lamati identified a shrinking financial resource 
as the major challenge facing the Department of Labour in the 2014/2015 financial year.  
The restricted budget has negatively affected human resources and staffing. South Africa’s 
Strategic Plan requires that branches do more over the next 5 years without an increase in 
resources. The shortage of labour inspectors has meant that inspectors’ time is often 
dominated by dealing with complaints and follow up activities rather than routine 
inspections. These difficult conditions are likely to have contributed to a high turnover of 
labour inspectors. In these circumstances, Cameron (2015) suggests that a lack of 
consequences for poor performance may be undermining the success of the inspectorate.  
A lack of internal control over record keeping has impacted on South Africa’s Auditor 
General (AG) in particular, as evidenced in the 2014 report where a lack of reliable evidence 
undermined the necessary financial statements. Information was also deemed unreliable for 
appraising inspection and enforcement services, PES and Labour policy/industrial relations.  
The AG was particularly concerned about the accuracy of data and its reliability. Importantly 
the data did not comply with SMART principles in that it was not measurable; nor was there 
sufficient proof to corroborate claims about the number of labour inspections that were 
undertaken.  This was linked to a heavy reliance on the manual system of data entry.  The 
AG recommended strengthening implementation procedures so as to assign responsibilities 
to individuals for collating evidence and reporting, with the intention of ensuring improved 
quality in future reports. The AG also encouraged the implementation of controls (e.g. 
reconciliations) and monitoring/evaluation responsibilities in respect of performance 
information, and improvements to the source documentation relating to the preparation of 
performance information.    
Further challenges in South Africa have arisen concerning the high turnover in the Director 
General position, which has led to a lack of leadership consistency with clear impacts on 
labour administration. This has had a particularly strong impact on the implementation of 
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the Strategic Plan and the Annual Performance Plan. Since 2009, there have been five 
different Directors-General.  
Sri Lanka also faces marked difficulties in terms of resource constraints, which hamper the 
effectiveness of its national system of labour administration. H wever, while the proportion 
of listed factories inspected under the Ordinance declined from 37 percent to 26 percent 
between 2002 to 2013, the number of listed factories more than doubled from 10,637 to 
23,844 over the same period. Accordingly, the department’s capacity actually appears to 
have expanded significantly in absolute numbers of inspections over the same period. In 
addition, the rate of investigation of complaints received has been sustained, with the number 
of investigations exceeding the number of complaints received in 2010.  These figures attest 
to the high volume of work carried out by the officers of the Industrial Safety Division and 
by offers at regional level.  
4.7 Trends and lessons learned 
Several lessons are evident from the above discussion. Increasingly it is acknowledged that 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators are desirable in order to measure 
performance and influence the behaviour of ministries and agencies. In any system of 
performance management, targets and resulting benchmarks require ongoing monitoring and 
appraisal to ensure their adequacy over time. Performance management systems use a 
variety of targets to encourage high performance standards and performance improvements.  
This is evident, for instance, in the use of key performance scores/indicators (South Africa), 
the prevalence of performance metrics (USA) and actions associated with timescales (UK). 
All methods are aimed at improving efficiency and transparency. In operational terms 
performance management systems commonly cover actions at a number of administrative 
levels and are intended to ensure that those actions are well coordinated.  
Achieving and maintaining a good standard of performance is, of course, not simply a matter 
of having appropriate systems and targets in place. Budgets obviously matter. In some 
countries austerity has led to a reduction in the budgets of labour ministries while in many 
developing countries the resources available to labour ministries can be very limited. The 
consequence can be pay stagnation and inadequate levels of staffing, which are in turn likely 
to have negative consequences for performance and mean that the most intractable labour 




5. Coordination and cooperation 
Inter-organization relations are extremely important in the implementation of policy. In 
some cases, two or more ministries might have a role in policy implementation and in many 
countries service delivery is delegated to subordinate bodies with which ministries will need 
to coordinate. In large federal countries, there is typically a need for cooperation between 
national ministries and local level bodies that will have varying degree of autonomy in 
relation to the administration of services. Inter-organizational relations have been further 
complicated by the widespread shift to involve private and voluntary sector organizations in 
the delivery of services, through public-private partnerships, contracting out and so forth 
(O’Toole, 2007). In addition to the need to ensure vertical coordination between the national 
and sub-national level, issues of horizontal coordination also need to be addressed so as to 
ensure that objectives in one sphere of policy (e.g. labour and employment) are consistent 
with, and supportive of, objectives in other policy areas. New labour policies often have 
implications for the programmes of ministries that are not primarily responsible for labour 
matters and it is therefore vital that all ministries are informed of new policy proposals at an 
early stage and that they have an opportunity to pass comment. 
Effective coordination can be impeded by, for example, unclear reporting lines; 
insufficiently clear divisions of responsibility across labour administration bodies; 
inadequate information flows between ministries and their subordinate bodies, and between 
different ministries and different subordinate bodies; inadequate training; and 
underdeveloped mechanisms for gathering, processing, using and sharing data (for a 
discussion of how such problems have affected Sri Lanka’s labour administration system, 
see Chandrasiri and Gunatilaka 2015: 22). 
A further consideration relates to the amount of autonomy that ministries allow subordinate 
bodies (e.g. regional and local offices or executive agencies) and other actors that might be 
involved in service delivery (e.g. private employment services). Devolving responsibility 
can increase the ability of labour administration bodies to develop strategies and 
programmes that take into account local circumstances. While this requires local-level 
flexibility, labour ministries also need to ensure that the mandate of the ministry is fulfilled 
and that core programmes are delivered to expected standards. In the case of subordinate 
bodies, labour ministries need to ensure that plans are agreed, that it is possible to monitor 
performance against the plan and that there are clear and effective communication channels 
and information flows. In the case of private providers, expectations are normally spelled 
out in contracts that typically link the payment of fees to the achievement of performance 
targets (for a discussion, see Koeltz 2013). 
5.1 Coordination of the development of policy and strategy  
(horizontal coordination) 
Some countries require an extensive cross-government consultation process on new policy 
proposals. In the Czech Republic, for example, the law requires that Ministries and their 
subordinate institutions exchange information, data and materials. Ministries issue opinions 
on the proposals of other ministries and other central administrative offices, most notably 
during the consultation process on draft legislation. In addition, ministries jointly prepare 
programmes affecting the kind of activities that cut across departments. Subordinate bodies 
take part in consultation processes when new legislation is being developed by the MoLSA. 
Managing directors of organizations, including Labour Office of the Czech Republic (LO 
CR) and the State Labour Inspection Office (SLIO), take part in meetings where they can 
highlight concerns or requirements (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 17). 
Coordinating bodies designed to provide orientation within and across specific policy areas 
are common. In Ireland, for example, a Cabinet Committee on Economic Recovery and Jobs 
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is chaired by the Taoiseach. It features ministers from key ministries, including the 
Department for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (DJEI), Education and Skills, Finance and 
Social Protection. A senior officials group feeds into the Cabinet Committee. Groups of 
senior officials also meet to discuss actions and progress in respect of discreet areas of social 
policy, such as labour market policy. These provide the Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Recovery and Jobs with policy papers and proposals, which can then be discussed.   
In the UK, a Government Labour Market Board (GLMB) helps to keep policies aligned 
across government. It is an informal coordination body that meets quarterly. The GLMB is 
composed of civil servants, all of whom are Directors General from relevant ministries, 
including BIS, the Treasury, Department for Communities and Local Government and 
Department of Education. The Department for Health and the Child Poverty Action Unit 
sometimes attend. The GLMB focuses on labour market evidence and how policies are 
aligning. It tries to achieve a consensus in relation to shared labour market challenges. 
Different ministries have different perspectives on how the labour market works and the 
GLMB provides a forum where these differences can be aired and discussed. The members 
try to achieve ‘alignment’ where possible. The GLMB is a strategic body. It asks: what are 
the problems (e.g. how do we respond to in-work poverty), what are the opportunities and 
what levers can government pull in relation to the labour market? It has examined cross-
cutting issues, such as the transition from education to employment, and asked the different 
departments represented on to the GLMB to provide inputs.  
In South Africa, the Department of Labour (DoL) aims to achieve internal coordination 
through regular meetings of various fora. There are annual meetings which are chaired by 
the Minister/ Deputy Minister of the DoL and which are attended by senior official within 
the ministry and by the Executive Officers of statutory bodies associated with the DoL. A 
Departmental Executive Committee meets quarterly to review performance. It is chaired by 
the DG. There is also a Management Committee, which is chaired by the Deputy Minister 
and which keeps track of the implementation of annual and mid-term resolutions. However, 
it appears that while linkages exist at a strategic level, operational matters still tend to be 
organised in silos (Cameron 2015: 21-22). A lesson for labour administration is that it is 
important that the coordination of strategy be accompanied by effective coordination of 
policy implementation. 
Example 5: South African ‘cluster’ system 
An important element of coordination in the South African government is the cluster system. Clusters are 
responsible for policy and legislative issues, as well as other horizontal cross-cutting matters. They comprise 
technical clusters (at DG level) and ministerial clusters (at ministerial level) which then submit reports to Cabinet 
committees for decision. Clusters coordinate policy issues before going to Cabinet. The DoL participates in the 
cluster system, mainly in the social and economic clusters. 
The four main cluster roles are to: 
(i) Improve Cabinet decision-making processes;  
(ii) Harmonise and align the work (including policies and priorities) of departments and reduce 
departmentalism (coordinate cross-cutting matters, legislation and policy);  
(iii) Produce cluster-based reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action  
(iv) Provide coordination or oversight over implementation of the Programme of Action (Presidency, 2014): 
However, there are some areas, which fall between cracks, and there is also duplication. Each department 
has its own mandate which sometimes makes cross-cutting coordination difficult. Furthermore, technical clusters 
do not always do their preparatory work adequately before items are considered by the ministerial clusters.  
Source: Cameron (2015: 24) 
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5.2 Coordination of the implementation of policy and programmes 
(vertical coordination) 
Horizontal coordination can help to ensure that policies in related areas are aligned and 
complement each other. It can prevent problems that can arise where departments work in 
silos and do not sufficiently appreciate how their activities relate to the activities of other 
departments and related bodies. However, ministries also need to ensure that policies and 
programmes are effectively implemented. Responsibility for implementation (operational 
matters) will normally reside with regional and local offices of sections of the ministry or 
with semi-autonomous executive agencies. It is therefore essential that systems be put in 
place to ensure effective vertical coordination. 
In the Czech Republic, the MoLSA has responsibility for legislation, budgets and priority 
setting. Measures are communicated to the LO CR and SLIO, which then communicate the 
measures to their regional offices (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 17). MoLSA coordinates 
inspection priorities by approving the programme of inspections that the labour inspectorate 
follows. ICT (discussed in Section 7) can facilitate vertical coordination. Sri Lanka’s Labour 
Inspection System Application (LISA) has fully automated the on-site inspection process, 
improved the collection and analysis of inspection and labour market data and thereby 
strengthened the basis for policy development and programme evaluation. LISA is used 
mainly to automate inspection schedules enabling the DoL to automatically generate duty 
rosters of inspection staff, thereby leading to increases in efficiency and productivity. It has 
also enabled DoL to coordinate activities between its head office and the 56 labour 
department offices spread throughout the country (Chandrasiri, and Gunatilaka 2015). 
Effective information exchange is an important element in ensuring coordination in respect 
of policy implementation. Information exchange can involve responding to requests from 
Ministries and bodies or the creation of shared databases. In many cases, information 
exchange is the norm and is particularly common in relation to labour inspection activities, 
including those relating to the informal economy (this is also discussed in Section 8).  
In the Czech Republic, one of the most fundamental practices underpinning cooperation and 
coordination between the various bodies in the labour administration system is the transfer 
of information between all levels and between all bodies. The LO CR, SLIO and Czech 
Social Security Administration regularly provide information to the MoLSA concerning 
their areas of responsibility. They also share information between themselves. The sharing 
takes place at central, regional and local levels and is required by law (Lehmann and 
Kyzlinková 2015: 18). In addition to information exchange, all three organizations support 
one another by means of advice and consultations on problematic issues. Representatives of 
both the LO CR and the SLIO rate cooperation between these institutions as positive, partly 
thanks to the existence of personal ties between employees because of some employees being 
transferred from the LO CR to the SLIO for illegal employment inspection work. 
Decentralisation of service provision and delegation of responsibility to semi-autonomous 
agencies is a frequently observed development in national systems of labour administration. 
In principle, decentralisation can ensure that programmes are more responsive to local 
circumstances. However, decentralisation can also give rise to coordination difficulties:  
1. In South Africa, the implementation of Department of Labour programmes is based on 
a decentralised agency model. Implementation of policy is delegated to local labour 
centres. There are three levels involved: national offices, provincial offices and labour 
centres. The ability of the national and provincial offices of the PES and inspection 
service to coordinate with local labour centres is hampered by reporting lines that are 
channelled through the Chief Directors of Provincial Operations (Cameron 2015: 22-
23). The PES and labour inspection service has insufficient power to influence local 
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level operations. The Department of Labor is currently considering a matrix system as 
a potential solution to this problem (as recommended in a 2012 ILO report).  
2. In the Czech Republic, coordination problems have arisen in relation to public 
employment services. In the 1990s, a two-tier system was established, comprising an 
Employment Services Administration (ESA) within the MoLSA and a network of 77 
district labour offices. However, the ESA was unable to exert effective control over the 
activities of the labour offices, which consequently had a lot of discretion in relation to 
the measures that they implemented. In addition, staff time in the labour offices came 
to be consumed by inspection and administration activities, resulting in less attention 
being paid to their primary responsibility (the provision of employment services). To 
address these problems, the system was centralised in 2011 through the creation of the 
Labour Office of the Czech Republic (LO CR). The 77 labour offices, which until this 
point had been legally independent, became contact points linked to 14 regional 
branches of the LO CR. The contact points now act as one-stop shops (Lehmann and 
Kyzlinková 2015). 
The reform has not, however, been regarded entirely as a success. On the one hand, the 
establishment of the LO CR has the potential to ensure a more consistent approach to 
the implementation of employment policies across the local labour offices (now contact 
points). The structure and the reduction in the number of managers (replacing 77 office 
managers with 14 regional directors) should enable better cooperation. On the other 
hand, critics have argued that centralisation has led to employment services becoming 
less able to respond flexibly to local circumstances. Furthermore, critics claim that 
staffing has been cut without any analysis of the systems staffing requirements having 
been undertaken (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 14-15). 
The shift to greater centralisation of employment services is not confined to the Czech 
Republic. In the UK, JobCentre Plus (JCP), which had operated as an Executive Agency of 
the DWP since its creation, was fully incorporated into the DWP’s operational activities in 
2011. This development was intended to encourage a ‘streamlining’ of the management of 
JCP. It was also a result of efforts by the DWP to reduce its corporate running costs by 40 
percent, as required by the government’s 2010 Spending Review. This development can 
therefore be understood in part as a consequence of the imposition of austerity rather than as 
an attempt to improve coordination. 
5.3 Coordination in Federal countries 
Particular coordination issues arise in federal systems, in which states or regions enjoy 
considerable autonomy in respect of decision making. In principle, the existence of 
substantial administrative apparatuses at sub-national level provides an opportunity to 
decentralise service provision so as to ensure that it is more responsive to the needs of 
workers and employers at local level, which might vary considerably across different parts 
of a country. However, there is a need to ensure that the objectives of the national 
government and of the local authorities and service providing bodies remain aligned.  
In North America, planning agreements have been used to establish clear requirements for 
the delivery of services at sub-national level: 
 Canada: From the mid-1990s Canada began to decentralise the provision of public 
employment services, which until that time had been delivered directly via Government 
of Canada offices.  This shift represented an attempt to better address the needs of 
unemployed workers and enterprises in different regions and do so more rapidly. The 
Government of Canada entered into Labour Market Development Agreements with 
provinces and territories, providing funding to support the design, delivery and 
management of skills and employment programs for unemployed Canadians, focusing 
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on those who were eligible for Employment Insurance (Koeltz 2015). In 2007 the 
government entered into six-year Labour Market Agreements with all provinces and 
territories to provide funding for programs and services for unemployed persons who 
were not eligible for Employment Insurance (EI) benefits and those with low levels of 
education, skills and qualifications. The agreements expired in 2014 and were replaced 
with new six-year Canada Job Fund Agreements. Central to these agreements is the 
Canada Job Grant, 4 which is intended to enable employers to train new or existing 
employees to fill vacant posts (Koeltz 2015). In an effort to ensure that private and third 
sector organizations comply with requirements, the Labour Force Development 
Agreements contain indicators and targets which help to establish clear and transparent 
expectations (Koeltz 2015).   
 USA: Similar coordination issues arise in the USA. Provisions of key federal acts relating 
to the labour market are administered at the level of the state, requiring coordination 
between the USDOL and state level authorities. The Workforce Investment Act 
authorises the creation of state and local Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs). State 
Governors make appointments to the state WIB, which is responsible for developing a 
state plan to deliver workforce development services. This plan is submitted to the US 
DOL for approval. 5 Each plan must include a strategic plan, an operational plan and 
‘assurances’ (i.e., state affirmations that key obligations of the law have been met).  States 
must also include an analysis of the state economy and the skills base and skill 
requirements using labour market information. The aim is to inform how the state will 
align policy, operations and administrative systems to meet the identified needs. 
Until July 2015, the state governor was able to require the state WIB to develop a Unified 
Plan to promote joint planning and coordination across various employment and training 
programs. From July 2015, the creation of a Unified Plan will be made a requirement. This 
is intended to improve coordination of programmes and stakeholders (Heinrich and King 
2015).  
Spain provides a further example of a country in which the distribution of authority between 
national and sub-national levels creates additional vertical coordination challenges for labour 
administration. Spain contains 17 Autonomous Communities, each of which has substantial 
scope for self-governance (Daza 2015). The state has exclusive competence on Labour 
legislation and social security and the role of the Autonomous Communities is to ensure the 
provisions are enforced. However, the Autonomous Communities have their own competence 
with regard to the application of labour legislation, especially the performance of inspection 
visits and the implementation of procedures for the enforcement of penalties imposed by the 
Labour and Social Security Inspectorate. Both the state and the Autonomous Communities 
are involved in the preparation of plans relating to Labour Inspection, including the 
development of objectives and programmes of action. The Director General defines the 
common technical and operational criteria relating to the inspection function. However, 
Territorial Committees of Labour and Social Security Inspection act as a mechanism for 
coordination between the Ministry and the Autonomous Communities. The composition, 
powers and rules of operation for these Committees are established by means of bilateral 
agreements between the general administration of the State and each Autonomous 
Community. Under these agreements, both the national authorities and Autonomous 
Communities define rules for technical support and expert collaboration, and for 
programming and follow-up regarding enforcement of the labour legislation (Daza 2015). 
 
4  For more details on the Canada Job Grant see 
http://www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/training_agreements/cjg/index.shtml 
5 The current WIA state plans cover the years 2012-2016 and can be accessed via the USDOL’s 




5.4 Cooperation and coordination with local stakeholders and providers 
Increasingly, private and third sector organizations are involved in the delivery of the 
services provided by national systems of labour administration, particularly in relation to 
employment services. The relationship between Ministries/PES and service providers is to a 
great extent managed on a contractual basis (Koeltz 2013), but other coordinating 
mechanisms may be beneficial. Furthermore, employers, trade unions and civil society 
organizations are key stakeholders in systems of labour administration and may be involved 
in national, regional and local fora that provide opportunities for consultation and 
information exchange (these relationships are also discussed in Section 6, which discusses 
‘partnerships’).  
In the Czech Republic, there are relationships between local stakeholders and the 
organizations charged with implementing employment policy (the Labour Office branches 
and regional labour inspectorates). The Labour Office cooperates with all labour market 
entities that help design and implement measures to increase employment. At regional level, 
there is cooperation with territorial self-governing units and their bodies and with the social 
partners in providing employment, labour force mobility, human resources development and 
social protection. In the regions, the Labour Office signs sectoral agreements with employers 
through regional chambers of commerce. Meetings and cooperation between LO CR 
representatives and employers are relatively regular at this level and regional branches can 
request information from employers regarding their employment plans (Lehmann and 
Kyzlinková 2015: 20). 
The LO CR can create advisory bodies composed mainly of representatives of trade union 
organizations, employers’ organizations, cooperatives, organizations representing the 
disabled and territorial self-governing units. The purpose of the advisory bodies is to 
coordinate the implementation of public employment policy and human resources 
development policy in the administrative district in question. The representatives provide 
opinions in relation to subjects such as the provision of contributions to employers under 
active labour market policy, re-training programmes, the organization of consultancy work, 
measures to promote equal treatment and collective redundancies (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 
2015: 20). 
As noted in Section 5.3., each US state has established a State Workforce Investment Board 
(WIB), which includes the Governor, members of the state legislature and representatives of 
employers, unions, economic development agencies and community-based organization. 
These boards play a central role in determining target groups for services, the types of 
services that should be provided and how these should be provided. Each WIB is required 
to operate at least one One-Stop Career Center (also known as American Job Centers). The 
local WIB enters into a ‘memorandum of understanding’ with the One-Stop partners that 
sets out the services to be provided through the One-Stop delivery system, how the service 
and operating costs will be funded, and methods for referral of customers between the One-
Stop operator and the partners. The One-Stop Centers are supposed to coordinate and 
strategically combine the federally-funded education, workforce and worker support 
programs of the USDOL, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human 
Services and Department of Housing and Urban Development (i.e. employment services, 
unemployment insurance, vocational rehabilitation, adult education, welfare-to-work and 
postsecondary vocational education). However, the coordination and alignment of services 
has not always been achieved in practice. In an attempt to improve local coordination, the 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), which will become effective in July 
2015, will require (rather than encourage) One-Stop Centres to co-locate the Wagner-Peyser 
Employment Services and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme 
alongside the programmes that it currently administers. States will be required to develop a 
unified four-year strategic plan for these core programmes with the aim of preparing an 
educated and skilled workforce that can meet the needs of employers (Heinrich and King 
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2015: 19). The core programmes will be need to report against common performance 
measures  
US States are also being encouraged to better align their workforce development activities 
with state and regional economic development plans, so as to ensure that the training and 
employment services offered are linked to expected industry growth, the related skill 
competencies required, and anticipated employment opportunities (King and Heinrich 
2015). The USDOL is urging state and local workforce development agencies to work 
toward developing comprehensive regional partnerships to facilitate this alignment.  One of 
the mechanisms for this greater level of coordination and planning is the formation of 
industry or sector partnerships and corresponding sectoral training programs (see Section 6).  
Germany provides a further example of a country that has attempted to improve local level 
coordination with stakeholders. The German government recognizes that tackling skills 
shortages is a particularly substantial challenge for smaller and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). To assist firms, the government created an ‘innovation bureau’, which brings 
together regional and local players in a more systematic way, raising awareness of already 
existing regional networks, and supporting the development of regional alliances. In 
addition, the Ministry for the Economy and Environment promoted the establishment of a 
‘competence center’, located at the Cologne Institute for Economic Research, which offers 
practical, hands-on advice and guidance to SMEs on a wide range of skills-related issues.  
5.5 Trends and lessons learned 
The examples discussed in this section point to the importance of finding effective ways of 
linking together the aims, strategies and implementation plans of the various bodies involved 
in national systems of labour administration. Cross-departmental coordination meetings 
involving ministers or civil servants can help to ensure that the objectives, policies and 
timetables of different ministries do not conflict and can help to improve inter-departmental 
communication and understanding of priorities and perspectives on labour market matters. 
At local level, there are examples of attempts being made to ensure that programmes are 
tailored to local circumstances and involve key stakeholders. Many labour market issues can 
be more effectively tackled where employers, unions and NGOs play a role. This implies 
some decentralization of responsibilities, which can come into conflict with the desire of 
ministries and agencies to exert control and ensure good coordination. Effective planning 
processes, local accountability and simple and reliable lines of communication and reporting 





The coverage and effectiveness of national systems of labour administration can depend 
greatly on the ability of public authorities to form strong partnerships with a range of 
stakeholders. The need for cooperative relations can come about as a result of decisions 
taken by governments in relation to the method of providing services, notably in the case of 
employment services, which increasingly involve service providers from the private and 
non-for-profit sectors. More generally, involving the social partners and other civil society 
organizations in the development of policies and programmes can help to ensure that services 
meet the needs of users and are responsive to changes in the labour market at national, 
regional and local levels.  
Example 6: Partnerships for workforce development in the U.S. 
Partnerships are central to the way workforce development programs operate in the US. In particular, 
sectoral partnerships are increasingly important. Sectoral partnerships may be initiated by a public program entity 
such as a local Workforce Investment Board or by a community-based organization, labor union, group of 
employers or other organizations (Mangatt, 2010). They form in order to address pressing labor demand and 
supply issues involving a particular industry sector (e.g., manufacturing, healthcare). These partnerships often 
tackle problems arising in the training pipeline in the industry sector, but more mature partnerships also delve 
more deeply into the causes and consequences of labour turnover.   
Career pathway approaches are a prominent feature of many sectoral partnerships. Career pathways are 
clear, structured paths for participants to pursue from program entry through the attainment of a series of labour 
market credentials, certificates and/or degrees that are valued by employers in a field or sector. Many of these 
pathways are established in community and technical colleges around the country and often feature ‘bridge’ 
programs to help participants with basic skills and language barriers acquire the skills necessary to succeed in 
the career pathway. Emerging evaluation evidence suggests that sectoral partnerships, career pathways and 
‘bridge’ programs are effective workforce development strategies when measured in terms of programme 
progress as well as employment and earnings impacts (see Maguire et al., 2010; King, 2014; Roder and Elliott, 
2011, 2014; Zeidenberg et al., 2010).  
6.1 Cooperation, consultation and negotiation between the State 
and social partners in relation to labour administration 
Social dialogue is an important feature of labour administration and employment relations 
in many countries. In Spain, an Economic and Social Council (ESC) acts as an advisory 
body. It is attached to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security and is composed of 
61 members appointed by the government. It includes members designated by the most 
representative trade unions and employers' organizations, as well as representatives of 
consumers, farmers, fishermen, cooperatives and worker-owned companies. The functions 
of the ESC include issuing opinions on draft legislation and drawing up surveys and reports.  
In the case of the Czech Republic, cooperation with non-state entities takes place mainly in 
the context of subsidy programmes designed to support organizations contributing to the 
department’s strategic activities. At a national level, cooperation with the social partners is 
mediated through the tripartite Council of Economic and Social Agreement (CESA).  
The Czech Labour Office cooperates with stakeholders across localities, including territorial 
self-governing units, NGOs, charities and employers. Cooperation with national NGOs or 
with churches is sometimes mediated by the Directorate of the Labour Office. The Labour 
Office also creates advisory bodies composed of the social partners and other cooperative 
bodies to aid cooperation on labour market issues.  
The Czech labour inspection office liaises with external entities in an educational and 
advisory capacity. It organises seminars, training sessions (sometimes co-devised with help 
from the social partners) and other educational activities in the fields of legislation, 
occupational injury/illness prevention, occupational safety, labour relations and working 
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conditions. These events are designed for personnel managers working in central public 
administration and local government authorities, trade unions, regional chambers of 
commerce and other entities.  
In South Africa, the DoL has taken steps in recent years to help develop partnerships further. 
With respect to regulating the informal economy (discussed at greater length in Section 8), 
the Inspection Enforcement Services (IES) work closely with a number of government 
departments, including Health; Environmental Affairs; Social Development (for Child 
Labour), Justice (prosecution); Mineral and Energy Affairs; Trade and Industry; Stats SA 
(for data) and the South African Police Services (SAPS – for child labour). The DoL assists 
the Department of Home Affairs 
The most important instrument of social dialogue in South Africa is the National Economic 
development and Labour Council (NEDLAC: established in law via Act 35 of the same 
name, 1994). NEDLAC is the main vehicle by which government, labour, business and 
community organizations cooperate. NEDLAC permits problem-solving and negotiation on 
a range of economic, labour and development issues. NEDLAC conducts work in four areas: 
public finance/monetary policy; labour market policy; trade and industry policy and 
development policy.   
The DoL also works closely with the South African Institute of Occupational and Safety and 
Health (SAIOSH), the National Institute of Occupation Health (NIOH), the Construction 
Industry Development Board (CIDB), the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS), the 
South African Council for Project and Construction Management (SACPCMP) and the 
South African Women in Construction Association (SAWIC). In addition, the DoL has 
entered into a partnership with Rhodes University, which has developed the country’s first 
ergonomics postgraduate programme as part of its Human Kinetics and Ergonomics 
Honours.  
In South Africa, one of the sub-programmes of Inspection and Enforcement Services is that 
of Statutory and Advocacy. This programme gives effect to the legislative enforcement 
requirement to educate stakeholders on labour legislation. This is a recently created 
programme, which encourages greater public awareness of campaigns. Government 
departments also liaise through this body together with other stakeholders (this includes a 
practice of sharing data).   
India’s NSLA also operates with a tripartite structure and within the system, the Indian 
Labour Conference (ILC) is the most popular forum for developing partnerships among the 
stakeholders.  Social partners (i.e. trade unions and employers’ representatives) are consulted 
in both statutory and non-statutory forums.  
6.2 Cooperation, consultation and negotiation between the State  
and social partners in relation to labour administration 
In Spain, the National Advisory Commission on Collective Agreements is a tripartite body 
created by the Workers' Statute (1980).  It provides counselling and consultation with the 
stakeholders of collective bargaining arrangements in order to determine the functional 
scope of the agreements. It was regulated by the Royal Decree 2976 /1983, of November 9, 
and its rules of operation were approved by Order on May 28, 1984. The Commission is 
composed of six representatives of the General Administration of the State, six of the most 
representative trade union organizations and six of the most representative Employers. In 
2013 the Commission reported on 75 cases. 
The Commission has been assuming other important functions, including the study and 
dissemination of results from research into collective bargaining arrangements across Spain 
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(assigned by Law 43/2006, of December 29, for the improvement of growth and 
employment). The Commission distributes information via a Collective Bargaining 
Observatory Bulletin, which provides detailed information – such as statistics and trend data 
- concerning recent collective agreements (in total since 2013 eight newsletters have been 
released). The labour reform of 2012 added to the traditional functions of the Commission, 
providing a new role for the resolution of discrepancies for lack of agreement on the 
procedures for derogation of working conditions provided for in the collective agreements 
in the event of economic, technical or organizational causes. The Commission may be called 
upon to intervene when the settlement procedures of the collective bargaining have not been 
applied or have not solved the discrepancy. In 2013, thirty cases were subjected to the 
Commission. 
The maintenance of this forum comes in contrast to the breakdown of social partnership 
across most areas of labour administration in Ireland. Until recently (i.e. the start of the 
financial crash) the social partners in Ireland had nominated candidates for the majority of 
labour administration/relations bodies. Since the financial crisis, the appointment process 
has reverted to one of open-competition, without nomination from either union or employer 
association groups (i.e. the government does not have to priortise advice from the social 
partners when selecting candidates for positions). Conversely in India trade unions and 
employers’ representatives are part of tripartite committees in both statutory and non-
statutory bodies at both Central and State level. For example, West Bengal maintains its own 
tripartite state level welfare boards for both unorganised workers and building and 
construction workers. At Central level, the Standing Committee on Labour and Indian 
Labour Conference are two tripartite forums where labour reforms are discussed in detail 
(Sarkar, 2015).  
6.3 Labour administration services delegated to social partners 
One pertinent example from Spain relates to the inter-confederal service of mediation and 
arbitration (SIMA). SIMA stems from an agreement of 25 January 1996, when the social 
partners agreed to establish voluntary procedures for the resolution of conflicts related and 
unrelated to the judicial and administrative systems. Conflicts arising in Public 
administration and entities of Public Law are not included in this system.  
The objective of the SIMA Foundation is to settle collective labour disputes arising between 
employers and employees or their respective representative organizations via mediation and 
arbitration procedures. Initiation of the mediation procedure prevents the calling of strikes 
and the use of lockout measures, as well as any other legal or administrative action which 
aims to resolve the dispute (i.e. as long as the procedures lasts). The parties may agree on 
arbitration at any point in the mediation process (or indeed without mediation taking place). 
From the total of 537 conflicts handled during the year 2013, 132 were resolved (28 per 
cent). 
In the different autonomous communities there are similar consultative bodies on labour 
relations (regional councils), with different titles or names (Councils, Institutes, Foundations 
or Tribunals) some of them with additional mediation functions.  
In Germany, the BMAS launched an official Partnership for Skills and a new Alliance for 
Initial and Further Vocational Training in 2014. The partnership – which was already 
foreseen in the coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and SPD – reiterated the 
commitment of all stakeholders to continue their efforts to address skills needs, while 
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identifying care target groups and priorities for action. 6 On the other hand, a new Alliance 
for Initial and Further Vocational Training (2015-2018) was agreed upon, which outlined a 
series of qualitative and quantitative goals.  7  
6.4 Involvement of the social partners in the governance of labour 
administration bodies 
Several bodies in Spain are worthy of attention here, beginning with the General Council of 
the National Employment System. The Council is composed of one representative from 
Autonomous Communities and by the same number of members of the General 
Administration of the State, business organizations and the most representative trade union 
organizations. The votes of business organizations and trade unions are weighted to ensure 
that they count equally, thus maintaining the tripartite nature of the Council. The Council 
also advises and reports on the Spanish strategy of employment and the Annual Plan of 
Employment Policy. 
In addition, the National Commission on Safety and Health at Work (CNSST) is a 
consultative body advising public bodies on the formulation of prevention policies. The 
CNSST brings together all the agents of the Spanish State involved in the improvement of 
working conditions and the quality of working life. It is composed of representatives of the 
General Administration of the State, the administrations of the Autonomous Communities 
and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and representatives of the most representative employers 
and trade union organizations, The CNSST works in Plenary, on the Standing Committee 
and Working Groups. Agreements are taken by majority voting based on votes cast from 
representatives of the Public Administrations (General Administration of the State and 
Autonomous Communities) and two votes from representatives of the business and trade 
union organizations. 
The Governing Council of the Wage Guarantee Fund has a basic purpose to guarantee the 
payment of workers’ claims against their employer when payment cannot be made because 
of insolvency. The fund covers workers’ wages and compensation in case of dismissal. The 
Council is the tripartite governing body of the wage guarantee fund. It is composed of the 
Chairperson, a secretary, four representatives of the Public Administration, five 
representatives of the Trade Union Organizations and five of the employers.  
The National Institute of Social Security (INSS) is an entity of the Social Security, with its 
own legal personality, attached to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security entrusted 
with the management and administration of the economic benefits of the Social Security 
system. Among the organs of government the INSS has a General Council composed of: 
thirteen representatives from the most representative trade unions; thirteen representatives 
of employers organizations; and thirteen representatives from the General Administration of 
the State. Its President is the Secretary of State for Social Security. 
 
6  The partnership agreement can be downloaded here: 
http://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Thema-Arbeitsmarkt/2014-11-19-fachkraefte-
erklaerung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, last accessed on May 29, 2015. 
7  The Alliance document can be found here: 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/A/allianz-fuer-aus-und-weiterbildung-2015 
2018%2cproperty=pdf%2cbereich=bmwi2012%2csprache=de%2crwb=true.pdf, last accessed on 




The Commission of Labour and Social Security Inspection is a tripartite body, composed of 
representatives of the General Administration of the State and the most representative 
employers and trade union organizations. The role of the Commission is to advise and make 
proposals and reports on the plans of activities developed by the Central Authority of the 
Labour and Social Security Inspection. 
Finally, the Council of the self-employment is a consultative body that aims to advise the 
Government on the socioeconomic and professional matters related to self-employed 
workers. The Council is attached to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security through 
the Secretariat of State for Employment. 
6.5 Cooperation with NGOs 
In Ireland, the inspectorate body NERA has faced (and continues to negotiate) barriers to 
inspection access with respect to workers operating in the domestic sphere. This matter has 
been formally raised as a concern by NGOs with respect to monitoring hidden work 
environments (e.g. domestic settings), which are more likely to involve exploitation of 
marginal segments of the labour force (including illegal migrant workers). With respect to 
access there remains a legal difficulty relating to a constitutional ban on entering private 
dwellings for inspection purposes. However, pressure from NGOs concerned with worker 
exploitation in these ‘hidden’ spaces has resulted in a partial solution: NERA now requests 
office appointments with the relevant parties outside of the place of work.   
By contrast joint inspections between NERA and the Garda Síochána (police) have not 
avoided criticism, primarily in the form of NGO concerns over police presence at 
inspections. There is a feeling among some NGOs (e.g. the Migrant Rights Council Ireland) 
that the police services prioritize the removal of illegal migrants as opposed to addressing 
the circumstances of their exploitation. This issue, which is also referred to in Section 8, 
remains a moot point for inspection services in general.   
Numerous civil society bodies have a stake in labour administration issues in Ireland, 
although limited formal relations between NGOs and government bodies have emerged. 
Civil society bodies maintain interests in tackling UDW by means of education and 
advocacy. At present it is understood that more could (and should) be done to coordinate the 
efforts of distinct campaign groups with interests in the human rights of migrant workers. 
This includes a number of NGOs that focus on aiding vulnerable and marginalised sections 
of Irish society (i.e. those liable for exploitation).  For instance, The Migrant Rights Centre 
Ireland (MRCI) promotes and supports migrant worker participation in policy and decision-
making arenas through advocacy and campaign efforts. The group has lobbied for forms of 
collectivisation and the development of migrant leaders, and also champions discrete 
campaigns on specific issues (e.g. the Domestic Workers Action Group: DWAG).  
Similarly, the Irish Organization of the Unemployed (INOU) pools related actors in civil 
society (e.g. community resource centres, information service, national NGOs and trade 
unions) with a view to improving the lives of the unemployed. The group provides support 
to local groups through the provision of training, information and analysis of Government 
policies. In addition, INOU coordinates with the social partners through its membership of 
the Community and Voluntary Pillar, and continues to liaise with the Trade Union movement 
and other national/international bodies with related interests.  Furthermore, the thinktank and 
justice advocacy organization Social Justice Ireland ttempts to influence policy in areas of 
social justice and inequality, while The Integration Centre maintains a similar commitment 
to the integration and inclusion of migrants into Irish society. Recently (late 2014) the 
Integration Centre announced a merger with the Immigrant Council of Ireland, primarily to 
provide a focus on the monitoring of National and Local Government Integration Strategies.  
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Outside of these action and advisory groups/NGOs, the Citizens Information Board (CIB) is 
the national agency and statutory body responsible for supporting the provision of 
information, advice and advocacy on social services and for the provision of the Money 
Advice and Budgeting Service. The CIB also part-funds the aforementioned Integration 
Centre, and in this sense a forum of coordination is established between the Department of 
Social Protection and the aforementioned agency.   
In South Africa, the Minister of Labour has established an advisory council to try to bring 
in stakeholder businesses, unions, NGOs, business and labour. The aim is not just to discuss 
policy but also to engage stakeholders. This committee is served by a technical Committee 
for the entire department (the Advisory Council for Occupational Health and Safety - 
ACOHS) which is served by 6 businesses and 6 labour representatives (including the Chief 
Inspector).  The department administers 25 regulations deriving from policy. This (potential) 
for interaction with NGOs is less evident in the case of India (NGOs have little role in 
tripartite negotiations), although the union SEWA (the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association of India) arguably performs a similar function to an NGO in its promotion of 
women’s employment rights.  SEWA is part of select tripartite consultative forums (e.g. the 
Indian Labour Conference). Certain NGOs are also invited to voice their opinion at these 
and related tripartite forums; this includes, for example, the NGO ‘Civic’ (based at 
Bangalore, Karnataka) which represents the interests of construction workers and is 
frequently invited to give feedback to the policy-making framework and tripartite forums 
(Sarkar 2015, 28-29).   
6.6 Involvement of the private sector and ‘third’ sector in labour 
administration and the consequences for service delivery 
In Spain the framework agreement between placement agencies and public employment 
services is a highly relevant forum for the coordination of public-private partnership 
projects. The framework agreement (which last two years) allows for inter-mediation of all 
public employment services that have accepted the terms.    
The tripartite foundation for training in employment is also relevant here, founded via a 
Sectorial Training Fund (STF). It is the only inter-sectoral organization responsible for 
fostering training initiatives among enterprises and workers. As the name implies, the 
foundation is governed on a tripartite basis and consists of representatives of the most 
representative Spanish business organizations (Cepyme and CEOE), unions (CCOO, UGT 
and CIG) and also public administration (INEM, which belongs to the Spanish Ministry of 
Employment and Social Affairs). The Foundation is assisted by the joint commissions, 
which are set up by representatives of employers and trade unions under sector social 
dialogue and collective bargaining processes. Their aim is, among other things, to fix the 
key criteria and priorities of the training activities of firms. The foundation conducts research 
and subsidises existing training activities carried out by companies.  
In South Africa the DoL strives to make labour administration more effective through the 
use of Inspection Authorities, which are third party independent contractors. The OHS Act 
defines an Approved Inspection Authority (AIA) in section 1(1)(i) as ‘an Inspection 
Authority approved by the Chief Inspector… with respect to any particular service shall be 
an approved inspection authority with respect to that service only’. Inspection Authorities 
are generally used by bigger employers to undertake voluntary inspections. They are 
registered by The South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) who issue them 
with certification.   
Finally, Sri Lanka has recently had successful experiences of partnership, notably with the 
ILO, which has helped to deliver recent ICT developments. In the first quarter of 2014 the 
Sri Lankan DoL assisted ICT Consultants, helping to identify potential candidates for 
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training. Candidates were selected from the 30 district offices based on their existing 
computer skills and also their ability to adapt to new technologies. They were trained in 
Computer Fundamentals by Microsoft Sri Lanka as part of a CSR partnership with the 
Department. This was followed by onsite training of these personnel by Infoshare, covering 
a minimum of 5 persons selected from each district office. In India the involvement of the 
private/third sector is largely restricted to service delivery (e.g. the digitization of records, 
printing services, internet services, the hosting of web portals etc.).   
6.7 Challenges associated with the involvement of non-governmental 
bodies (e.g. issues relating to contracting with private/third sector 
bodies) 
In South Africa challenges have emerged in association with the Voluntary Protection 
Programme (VPP), which encourages employers to take responsibility for law compliance 
and so encourage self-regulation (in this sense companies themselves may be construed as 
non-government bodies involved in their own regulation). The companies ESKOM (a power 
company) and SASOL (a chemical company) have been cited as good examples of firms 
which have successfully engaged with VPPs, thus allowing labour inspectors to concentrate 
on other, potentially more relevant, inspection cases. However, one problem identified with 
the VPP concerns companies (including SASOL) which operate through multiple sites.  
Consequently, areas of work associated with major firms may be more or less compliant 
than others.   
A further challenge of quality control has emerged with respect to the Inspection Authorities 
who fall within the remit of third party independent contractors in South Africa. These 
contractors require their own equipment and must internally keep up to date with labour 
legislation and regulation. However, a recent audit undertaken by the DoL found that a 
number of these units do not conform to statutory requirements. Accordingly, the number of 
registered Inspection authorities has, in recent years, reduced steadily from 100 to just 32.   
The DoL has conceded (2014a: 10, 24) that there is a lack of adequate instruments for the 
monitoring and evaluation of labour policies and programmes over time. In particular, the 
system for monitoring and evaluating stakeholder participation and strategic partnership is 
seen to be lacking. This is due to problems related to the limitations of the manual case 
management system (in many cases there are different forms to fill in).  
A further problem associated with the involvement of non-government bodies and private 
companies (as raised in the case of India, Sarkar 2015) concerns data confidentiality and 
risks associated with the conversion of hard copy material (e.g. social security records) into 
digital formats.   
6.8 Trends and lessons learned 
Social dialogue and tripartite governance systems remain key features of labour 
administration in the majority of countries considered. Social dialogue committees operate 
on either a statutory or a non-statutory basis, depending upon the national context. 
Consultation with social partners can help to ensure that policies are informed by the 
experiences and knowledge of those who are likely to be affected by them and in principle 
can help to ensure that policies are supported by both employers and trade unions. 
Relationships with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) also offer a number of potential 
advantages to effective labour administration. For instance, NGOs are often well placed to 
draw attention to high-risk employers and groups may be effective in accessing and 
supporting the most vulnerable workers in the labour market, such as migrant workers. 
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NGOs may also play an effective communication role, disseminating information to workers 
who may be wary of cooperating with formal government agencies. In such instances, NGOs 
may act as effective conduits for change and dissemination of information in partnership 
with national labour inspectorates. Relationships of this sort may nevertheless become 
fraught because of contrasting mandates and legal obligations: e.g. labour inspectorates may 
have an obligation to report illegal migrant workers to the authorities, whereas NGOs may 
prioritise the interests of these workers.  
Collaboration may be improved through the inclusion of NGOs in tripartite forums. There 
are examples of both success and failure in relation to private and ‘third’ sector involvement 
in labour administration and service delivery, with examples ranging from the use of third 
party independent contractors in labour inspection to the delivery of ICT services. In such 
instances it is important for the government to monitor and evaluate relationships on an 
ongoing basis. This is important for a variety of reasons, including the possibility of 
improved quality control, the ability to improve knowledge transfer and the need to ensure 




7. Use of Technologies 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has a longstanding association with 
attempts to modernize public administration (Zouridis and Thaens 2003; Bhuiyan 2011; 
Taylor 2007; Bannister and Connolly 2014; Miscuraca 2012; Miscuraca et al. 2011). 
Bannister and Connolly (2014) have emphasized the transformative potential of ICT 
developments with reference to the creation or extension of values (e.g. transparency and 
responsiveness) in the public sector. More generally ICT enhancements have been linked 
with improved economic efficiency (e.g. via rationalization) and cost saving associated with 
a ‘more for less’ ethos in the public sector. Developments are also associated with the 
improved potential to help integrate and connect individuals and organizational units (e.g. 
Margetts 2012: 382).  
7.1 Technology and labour administration 
The use of technology is of central importance to labour administration. It can impact on the 
capability of labour administration to provide services (e.g. inspection visits; referrals to 
training programmes or placements on jobs) and also on policy-making. As Rychly notes, 
‘In general, the absence of a reliable, up-to-date and comprehensive database covering all 
aspects of labour, working conditions and industrial relations is a common problem in labour 
administration; and the consequent lack of access to information that is relevant, reliable and 
recent has an adverse impact on decision-making’ (Rychly 2013: 37).  Technology may be 
particularly important in the area of labour inspection and functions charged with regulating 
the informal economy. For instance, without some degree of technological investment, 
employment officers and labour inspectorates may be forced to manually gather information. 
Aside from the labour time, involved, rudimentary collection methods (i.e. without an 
electronic format) may severely damage the ability of different administrative functions to 
share data. Even when data is electronically gathered, it must be made available in a 
transferable format if other units/managers are to benefit. Obstacles to sharing databases 
kept by discrete public bodies remain significant barriers in many areas. Inadequate ICT 
remains a central problem for labour administration in ‘developing’ countries and many in 
the West (particularly in the context of post 2008 austerity and smaller state budgets). 
Inadequate communications technology can cause communication/coordination difficulties 
between the ministries, attendant agencies and field offices in all contexts.   
7.2 The forms of technology that are used and how extensively they are used 
In the US, technologies have long been used to aid the administration of Unemployment 
Insurance (UI). The 1993 Unemployment Compensation Amendments mandated the 
creation of a ‘worker profiling and reemployment services (WPRS) system’ for UI programs 
to use. This development proved the catalyst for UI experimentation with ‘big data’, used to 
identify workers who had exhausted their benefit entitlements and allow for tailored 
programme performance (e.g. factoring in programmes for those with similar characteristics 
for education, job tenure, industry and occupational backgrounds as well as the local 
unemployment rate).  (Heinrich and King 2015: 46-47).   
Spain maintains a considerable range of ICT initiatives geared to enhancing the effectiveness 
of labour administration. It deploys the ‘Observatory of e-administration and Digital 
Processing’ to periodically survey e-administration efforts. In addition, the IRIA Report 
‘Information and Communication Technologies in the Public Administration’ analyses 
information on the technology, human, economic and procurement resources in information 
and communication technologies and systems. It covers the State Administration and Local 
Governments and is published by the Observatory every two years.  
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Data on ITC related to Autonomous Communities are disseminated in the Report ‘E-
government in the autonomous regions’. In this report the Observatory integrates annually 
information on the subject provided by the autonomous communities through Sectorial 
Conference on Public Administration. 
Until recently, Sri Lanka operated with a paper-based system of administration. In 2010, the 
DoL sought technical assistance from the ILO to develop an automated system through a 
private software development company. The end result was the development of the Labour 
Inspection System Application (LISA), which began to be implemented in 2013. LISA 
functions as a small unit of the PRTP division of the DoL in the Sri Lankan Government.   
There have also been recent ICT developments in the Czech Republic, which have been 
designed to enhance labour inspection services.  Efforts are evidenced by a recent project 
entitled ‘The Creation of a Central Register of the Electronisation of Labour Inspection 
Tasks’ (RELIT, 2010-2014) designed to create a central register to share data from multiple 
public administration bodies. This project included the use of mobile online access to data 
for inspectors, thus enhancing the overall infrastructure of labour inspection online.  The 
system was officially launched in October 2014. Initial problems included the persistent 
slow transfer of data, although MoLSA anticipates that RELIT will eventually provide a 
faster information transfer from the field to head office. The system is also intended to 
improve the chances of creating a data archive relevant to inspection services. In India the 
national e-governance plan has focused on delivering improved accountability and 
transparency, underwritten by a budget of 200,00 lakh for IT infrastructure in the 2014-2015 
period (Sarkar 2015: 31). This budget helped to enhance the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment’s website and was also used to upgrade the previous networking equipment 
and so the overall Local Area Network (LAN) facility.   
7.3 Services provided electronically 
In the UK, various services related to labour administration are mediated through ICT 
formats and initiatives. The DWP continues to invest in ICT, and in December 2012 
published its Digital Strategy, setting out plans for continued enhanced digital service 
provision. Digital service offerings include a range of benefit schemes in addition to the 
online registration of Jobseeker’s allowance (which has risen from around 10 percent of new 
claims in September 2010 to over 80 percent by January 2014). The benefits include 
Universal Credit, Personal Independent Payments and Carer’s Allowance. Additional DWP 
digital services include: 
1. Services allowing employers to advertise job vacancies via Universal Jobmatch 
(allowing employers to manage vacancies online); online features allowing unemployed 
workers to manage CVs online; and the ability for employers/workers to receive 
automated matches linking one another.    
2. During 2014-15, 6,000 Internet Access Devices were made available at Jobcentres 
during 2014-2015. The devices were intended to assist those who do not have their own 
means of digital access.   
The UK’s mediation body ACAS also maintains a website8 with an online helpline 
(including a chatbox). It also runs a telephone helpline. 
In the U.S., the WHD, along with other agencies in the USDOL, has adopted an open-
government position and posts planning and performance data on the USDOL website as 





applications, to broaden its reach.  Two examples of this aspect of the WHD’s efforts to use 
technology include the following (USDOL, 2014): 
1. In May 2011, the USDOL launched its first free smartphone application: a timesheet. 
The timesheet, which is available in English and Spanish and compatible with the 
iPhone, iPod Touch and other platforms, helps employees independently track the hours 
they work and determine the wages they are owed. It has the potential to support 
subsequent WHD investigations if their employer has failed to maintain accurate 
records. 
2. In July 2013, the WHD issued the DOL Fair Labour Data Challenge to encourage 
development of a smartphone application ‘to inform consumers on proper business 
practices, including compliance in fair and equal pay for workers’.  As conceived, the 
Challenge sought to create a smartphone app that would integrate WHD’s publicly 
available enforcement data with consumer ratings websites, geo-positioning sites, and 
other relevant data sets, such as those available from state health boards. 
Spain provides a further example of a country that has enhanced provision of services 
through ICT. From the Electronic Office of SEPE, workers, employers and jobseekers can 
access a list of administrative procedures that enable, among others, to: 
 Perform the full process online, download, and complete forms through an electronic 
registration system (when applying for unemployment benefits and subsidies) 
 Request and query data online (certificates) and perform simulations (benefits 
calculations). 
 Complete online and print forms for later delivery in the offices of the SEPE. 
 Employers can also communicate to the Public State Employment Service (SEPE) the 
information relating to the measures of collective dismissal, suspension of the 
employment relationship and reduction of the working time. 
In the field of Social Security9, the TGSS’s ‘RED System’ offers companies, business groups 
and professionals a means to exchange information and documents between both parties 
(TGSS and users) via the internet. Areas covered by the RED System include: 
 Affiliation: affiliation, termination of affiliation and data changes for workers, as well as 
requesting and viewing reports on workers and companies. 
 Contributions: submitting documents (Payroll Report), processing of balances owed, and 
paying in contributions by direct debit or electronic payment. 
 Processing medical reports beginning and ending medical leave. Submission of 
maternity/ paternity certificates (RECEMA). 
In the field of OSHA, there is a public advice portal named ‘Prevention 10’, which is a tool 
that was designed by the National Institute for Health & Safety at Work to help employers 
with fewer than 10 employees to carry out occupational risk assessment of their premises 
and processes, using various methods of self-evaluation.  





 ‘Evalúa-T’ (‘Evaluate-Yourself’’): its objective is to encourage companies to assess risks 
establish a prevention plan, and organize prevention activities. 
 Servicio ‘STOP riesgos laborales’ (‘STOP occupational risks service’): a telephone 
support service that assists and guides firms. 
 ‘Instruye-t’ (‘Train Yourself’): a platform to develop training plan for the employer so 
that can personally assume the prevention management. 
 ‘Autoprevent’ (‘Self-prevent’): a tool designed for advising and specific training self-
employed workers without employees. 
During the year 2012 more than 58,000 visits to the page of “prevencion10.es” were 
registered, with close to 7,000 downloaded forms of self-evaluation. A total of 2,700 
employers have also benefited from an assisted version ("Evalua-t") to perform the 
assessment of risks in their business.    
A further good example of the use of ICT to provide services is provided by Ireland. The 
OECD has cited Ireland’s BeSMART.ie initiative as an instance of innovation in the Irish 
public service. The service is designed to assist SMEs who previously were likely to have 
no risk assessments or else paid for the services of a consultant to prepare risk assessments 
at substantial costs. Accordingly, BeSMART is intended to encourage SMEs to understand 
and develop risk assessments at little or no cost, thus encouraging health and safety 
compliance.  
Example 7: BeSMART.ie (the Business Electronic Safety Management and Risk Assessment Tool 
for small businesses) 
BeSMART.ie: 
• Offers free (comprehensive) online resources to businesses so that they can proactively manage health 
and safety within their workplace.  
• Allows small businesses to prepare site-specific risk assessments and a safety statement using a simple 
four step process (content written in lay English). 
• Covers 200 business types in the retail, hospitality, manufacturing, service industry and private healthcare 
and enables 320 hazards to be risk assessed. Accordingly, BeSMART.ie allows business owners and 
managers to take ownership of their workplace health and safety. 
• It is also viewed as a useful educational tool that contains information, guidance and templates (free to 
download). 
7.4 Use of new technologies in relation to the management of labour 
administration bodies 
Spain has successfully promoted numerous e-government functions vis-à-vis common 
infrastructures and services managed by the Directorate General for Administrative 
Modernisation. The main common services of e-government in Spain includes: 
 The Network SARA is the communications network that links all the Spanish 
Administrations within a private network system. It enables any government agency to 
communicate with any other and use all the electronic services they offer. This network 
connects the Ministries and its public bodies, all the Autonomous Communities, entities 
of constitutional nature or with functional independence, as well as local entities through 
the networks of the Autonomous Communities. It covers 92 percent of the Spanish 
population. SARA is also connected with the ‘sTESTA’ network of the European Union. 
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 Platform for validation of certificates and electronic signatures (@signature) is designed 
to automatically check the revocation status of digital certificates and digital signatures, 
for all the telematics transactions between citizens and Spanish Administrations. 
 The TS@ Platform provides services to 157 agencies from all of the Spanish authorities. 
In 2012 it facilitated a total of 20,075,000 sealed electronic transactions between 
Administrations. 
 The intermediation Platform Data avoids the need for citizens to produce administrative 
certificates attesting data already in the possession of the Administrations. With this 
intermediation platform the agencies can obtain online validation, by electronic means, 
of data relating to a citizen (photocopy of the ID card, registration certificate, certificate 
of working life, birth certificate, etc.). 
 ORVE/SIR (Virtual Registry Office and System for Registries’ interconnection), which 
interconnects the registration offices of Public Administrations by telematics means, 
making use of the Common Electronic Registry.  
 Human Resources Management Systems in the General Administration of the State. This 
provides an integrated systems of personnel management, supports administration of the 
payroll, and provides civil servants with information about career opportunities, training, 
retirement and so forth. 
 Electronic Invoice. There is a single point of receipt for electronic invoices. It is estimated 
that each electronic invoice results in savings of €3. 
 SOROLLA2 system supports the management of budgets by enabling, among other 
things, the generation of electronic records of expenditure and the presentation of 
accounts by electronic means. 
UK labour administration has benefited from the use of ICT, with notable improvements in 
terms of planning and enhanced transparency. This is epitomised by the Health and Safety 
Executive, where all staff complete work-recoding returns to a Corporate Operational 
Information System (COIN).  COIN provides ‘real time’ information about the performance 
of individuals and divisions of the HSE. It also contains information about progress in 
relation to individual cases.  Accordingly, the COIN system provides numerous performance 
benefits to the HSE by effectively capturing information, which can be retrieved at any time 
(thus feeding in to operation management and planning processes).  In addition, the system 
has facilitated a degree of standardisation in respect of agent processes whilst allowing 
inspectorate to exercise discretion (augmenting this process agents are required to consider 
a range of assessments relating to risk and related strategic factors before arriving at 
decisions).   
The HSE also maintains an Operational Information and Intelligence team (OIIT) that may 
provide information from COIN for the purposes of crosscutting operational work, 
inspection and enforcement.  Data is instantly available via a software package known as 
‘QlikView’ for selected users across HSE.  This allows relevant actors (e.g. the 
Directorate/division planners and performance managers) to verify that inspection work has 
been carried out on particular sectors.   
With specific reference to the informal economy, India’s Ministry of Labour and 
Employment has also integrated smart card technology (e.g. the Samajik Mukti Card or SMC 
in West Bengal) to record and track the personal data of workers (this includes photo 
integration, a Unique Workers’ Identity Number or UWIN and data relevant for the social 
security system). Technology has also supplemented the PES, for instance through the use 
of employment portals (e.g. the National Career Service Portal) useful for job advertising 
and matching, and so relevant for jobseekers, prospective employers and government data 
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sources.  This case is well evidenced in West Bengal where the Employment Bank (i.e. a 
specific example of an employment portal) has assisted employers, placement agencies and 
jobseekers (inaugurated in July 2012).   
7.5 Main benefits  
In the US, unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are delivered via the internet. This is a 
major innovation that has occurred over the past decade or so with great implications for 
staffing, training and performance. States have almost completely transformed their claims 
process from traditional in-person to a mix of telephone and online claim filing. This has 
made it possible for states to deal with large numbers of UI claimants without hiring 
additional staff (except during the early period of the Great Recession), but it has also 
delinked benefit receipt from job search activity to a significant degree. Recently, adverse 
effects begun to surface in the form of identity theft and fraudulent benefit provision, partly 
related to the lack of in-person service (Texas Workforce Commission Staff Interviews, 
2014). It may also have diminished the effectiveness of activation policies in the U.S. as UI 
recipients have not been personally connected to One-stop Centres and the services they 
provide.   
In Spain the savings generated from the use of the ‘@signature’ and the ‘TS@ Platform’ 
schemes amounted to more than 26,000,000 €.  However, there has not been a detailed study 
of productivity growth in the scope of the General Administration of the State in relation to 
e-government. Electronic administration has allowed savings in terms of paper consumption 
and a reduction of travel to perform the administrative processing of services or procedures. 
Electronic notifications are now configured as one of the main performance metrics with 
respect to environmental impact. It is understood that electronic processes saved 
approximately 8.3 tonnes of paper in 2013. 10  
One of the greatest ICT success stories under review is provided by the Sri Lankan case of 
the LISA programme, which has offered a facility to automate inspection schedules as 
opposed to the laborious manual system. This has enabled a faster collection of more 
accurate labour inspection data, storage through secure systems, and the ability to share and 
analysis data between divisions.  This in turn has allowed more efficient follow-ups and 
enforcement (particularly with reference to prosecutions). The quality of evidence should 
also improve as LISA enables DOLs to upload both documents and other evidence (e.g. 
photographic and audio material).  This material will be readily accessible in electronic form 
to those dealing with prosecutions, and obviate the costs of storing and transporting files 
relating to cases. LISA will also generate statistical reports with accurate information that 
senior management of the DoL can use for supervision and management processes. 
The South African DoL entered into a ground-breaking information and technology 
partnership deal with Siemens Business Services in 2002. Based on a Public Private 
Partnership, this contract was worth initially a total of over R1.2 billion (over a period of 10 
years), the first of its kind under South Africa PPS regulations. It had been estimated that it 
would have cost the DoL around R250 million more had it implemented the IT system itself 
(Cameron 2015). The partnership was intended to deliver numerous benefits, including 
opportunities for business process improvement, upfront capital investment and, 
importantly, access to private sector expertise with a view to knowledge transfer. This was 
further intended to enhance possibilities for effective and rapid alignment to e-governance 
and the associated service benefits of this on end-users. The drawbacks and risks associated 
with this (ultimately disastrous) partnership are further detailed in the report.    
 
10  Report to the Council of Ministers on the situation of the e-government p. 84 
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7.6 Costs (financial and other) and related drawbacks 
As Margetts (2012) notes, the uptake of ICT in public administration has not been without 
(in many cases substantial) financial cost. Since the 1980s and 1990s many governments 
have sought the expertise of ICT professionals, contracting out support services in the name 
of ‘systems integration’ (ibid: 387).  This is particularly the case in the USA and UK, coupled 
with a trend of oligopolistic computer services provision with a relatively concentrated 
market for major ICT contracts. This trend has been less extreme in most EU member states 
outside of the UK, where NPM trends have involved less outsourcing as a solution to ICT 
delivery. Most famously this involved the ‘Rhineland model’ of smaller contracts based on 
more consensual relations (ibid: 388).   
Arguably one of the main drawbacks for all countries negotiating with third party suppliers 
of ICT is the co-dependent nature of contractual relations and the loss of control this implies. 
The costs of these initiatives (like many ‘mega-projects’) are also hard to predict and 
forecasted bills often fall substantially short of the real costs. Contracted ICT firms may also 
gain an unhealthy influence over policy innovations (Margetts 2012: 388; Dunleavy 1994, 
Margetts and Dunleavy 1995).    
In the case of Sri Lanka, the LISA project still lacks necessary administrative support and 
infrastructure development. It is estimated that this, and the formal establishment of a LISA-
supported data-base system, will cost around $140,000 (U.S.). It is estimated that the project 
itself will cost around $44,000 per annum (i.e. this is the cost to maintain the project). In the 
case of the Czech Republic the total budget for the data-sharing of inspection programme 
(RELIT) was CZK 54.4 million (nearly €2 million).  However, costs of €1.7 million were 
met by the EU for this objective. Accordingly, in both of the above instances (Sri Lanka and 
the Czech Republic) it is clear that outside funds offer a vital stream of support for labour 
administrations in clear need of ICT developments. India has also struggled to invest the 
necessary funds needed to comprehensively introduce ICT developments in a range of labour 
administration contexts. Added to this there has been no comprehensive cost-benefit analysis 
for labour administration bodies and service users.   
7.7 Preconditions for effective use of new technology 
The effective use of new technology in labour administration depends on a number of 
factors.  These include the amount of governmental investment in equipment, training and 
information.  There are also important society-wide factors to bear in mind, for instance the 
proportion of citizens who have access to the internet and related telecommunications (e.g. 
mobile phones). Factors such as these may explain why cost reductions do not automatically 
follow from investment in ICT infrastructure. Results from Galazka's (2015: 25) report on 
an ILO global survey of ICT use indicate that 15 percent of national respondents reported 
that the implementation of new technologies did not result in a cost reduction.  
Based on problems encountered in the case study countries, several lessons may be drawn: 
7.7.1 The need to outline appropriate terms of reference with third 
party suppliers 
The South African case study points to the need for Government to outline specific terms of 
reference, codes of practice and related technical requirements for third party ICT providers. 
This view was echoed by the South African Treasury review of the Siemens case, which 
found several flaws in the PPP. In the main, criticisms centred on the insufficient monitoring 
and contract management by the Department of Labour. Overall, the department was seen 
to lack a consistent change management approach (i.e. implemented by the department) 
required for the integration of the business into the new IT environment. There was also 
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found to be a lack a contract understanding by Department of Labour officials, which 
resulted in contractual remedies not being identified or used in the face of poor performance.   
When ‘swapping’ between ICT service providers, it is often beneficial for governments to 
follow PPP agreements (e.g. in the South Africa case) which use a transitional termination 
process covering various services, contracts and assets for the department.  This is necessary 
in order to ensure a smooth transition without disruption to services. In the case of South 
Africa, this involved a role for consulting firm Accenture to ensure a smooth takeover in 
addition to advice services from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC).   
7.7.2 Phased development plans are necessary 
In the case of Sri Lanka, it is possible to outline three major phases of the state’s move to an 
ICT-based labour administration system. Although the transferability and relevance of these 
stages for all developing countries may be open to debate, Sri Lanka’s procedural map 
worked as follows: 
1. A period of around 12 years spent on initial attempts at computerization and on 
feasibility studies, policy debates and case specific experimentations.   
2. A second period in which ILO intervention and technical support enabled the 
development of the LISA system.   
3. Completion of the initial phase of project implementation.   
The Sri Lankan case indicates the slow (and sometimes arduous) process of applying modern 
technology to labour administration in a highly orthodox, departmental type, public sector 
organization.  This trend is likely to be mirrored in similar ‘developing’ countries undergoing 
substantial ICT investment. In such cases, poor infrastructure facilities, inadequate policy 
support at the national level, and question marks over the funding of future phases of the 
project all threaten the efficacy of investments (and indeed, this is true for the Sri Lankan 
case study). Accordingly, institutional stability is necessary and the absence of this is a major 
risk to all ICT endeavours. 
7.7.3 Trial systems and studies 
In the UK trial systems have been important in ensuring the effective uptake of IT initiatives.  
This has included the Department for Work and Pension’s IT team working with select 
Jobcentre Plus offices (London Bridge, Newport and Rusholme) to identify and discuss how 
to run Digital Jobcentres.  These activities included working out how to source hardware and 
provide support at the same time as staff and claimants learning how to use the new 
technologies. Accordingly, experimentation is often an important pre-requisite for effective 
technology transfer; in this instance including the use of self-check-in, video-conferencing 
(to cut costs of travelling to interviews) and diagnostic questionnaires to assist unemployed 
workers to identify the types of work for which they would be best suited.   
Studies were also conducted at JCP offices in Clydebank and Leicester in the UK to help 
formulate a new processing approach (launched nationally in November 2013) to make 
better use of technology. Outcomes from this process included the use of Short Message 
Services (SMS) to text appointment times and other information/scanning evidence at 
Jobcentres. This has helped to enable faster sharing of information by cutting down on more 
cumbersome faxing/courier transit methods.  
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7.7.4 Impact on training needs 
There are also clear impacts on training needs which stem from ICT investment and the 
development of more up-to-date administrative infrastructures, which use modern 
technology. These typically includes the need to train officers in the use of ITC. In addition, 
ICT itself may be used effectively in training purposes.   
The need for well-trained staff is well demonstrated in the case of Sri Lanka, where initial 
engagement with LISA proved challenging for many staff lacking basic IT skills and 
knowledge. Training may also need to incorporate a means of overcoming staff inertia, 
particularly in those overly accustomed to past norms and ways of working. Such employees 
may be reticent to adapt to modern administration practices and ICT developments. As the 
following cases demonstrate, there are several potential solutions to training dilemmas.   
7.7.5 Government-led training provision 
In the case of Spain, a Civil Service training school is provided through the National Institute 
of Public Administration. This school offers specialist training in “e-government” and 
attendant training in computing tools.  In addition, the Spanish government also trains labour 
inspectors through a ‘School of Labour and Social Security Inspection’ which uses on-line 
training for staff. The School developed 184 courses throughout the year 2013 in the two 
areas of activity of the Continuous Learning Plan (centralized and territorialized). Up to 25 
of the 56 courses centralized were offered online. This platform also allows the School to 
offer courses with high interaction and participation of the trainees. In addition to the highly 
interactive content, the students have supplementary materials, forums, chat, etc. that 
facilitate high-quality education continuously supported by tutors. The ‘Course Catalogue’ 
includes technical, procedural, legislative and methodological issues, is periodically adapted 
according to the needs of the personnel. 
Similar developments elsewhere include the UK’s creation of ‘Digital Academies’ to train 
staff (first launched in February 2014). Participants in the Academy are involved in an 8-
week intensive training programme.  
7.7.6 Training through third parties 
When soliciting third-party suppliers, it may also be possible to secure training benefits from 
these firms as part of the contractual arrangement. In South Africa, the Department of Labour 
partnership with Siemens included a responsibility on the part of Siemens to provide IT 
architecture, systems development (including training services) for the new systems, the 
design, construction and implementation of new systems. Department IT staff were 
transferred into the Siemen’s operation where they received training in the appropriate 
skillsets. The Department also developed an ICT Skills Factory, which enrolled qualified 
individuals in junior positions with a view to upskilling for the future.   
7.8 Trends and lessons learned 
Research has demonstrated that the use of the ICT in labour administration systems is 
increasing (Galazka, 2015). As illustrated above, this has brought both benefits to labour 
administration as well as fresh risks and challenges.  ICT has enhanced the information flows 
between officials across different levels of labour administration hierarchy, facilitating 
easier collections and transfers of relevant data, presentations and the provision of work-
related information to employees (Galazka 2015). There has been a widespread introduction 
of websites, email and social media use, and the uptake of software-enabled tablets in labour 
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inspection, although a digital divide still persists between developed and developing 
countries.   
Significant challenges remain in developing countries, which experience a general lack of 
technological connectivity and a widespread lack of technological literacy. However, as 
noted above, it is also the case that implementing ICT does not necessarily result in 
significant cost reductions. This word of caution is especially pertinent when considering 
the large costs that can be involved when implementing ICT, the unpredictability of these 
costs, and the variable reliability of suppliers, to whom labour ministries may have to make 
a long-term commitment (as in the case of South Africa, Cameron 2015). Priority issues 
identified by Galazka (2015) also include a need to identify the most pertinent needs for the 
use of new technologies (e.g. training, infrastructure development) which are likely to 
enhance both service management and delivery. Financial costs and difficulties in achieving 
a knowledge transfer of ICT skills (also witnessed in South Africa) may be reduced thorough 
organization-wide planning and efforts to encourage the development of an ICT culture 




8.  Extending Labour Administration to the informal economy 
This section of the report examines various attempts by national governments to extend the 
scope of labour administration to the informal economy. Particular attention is paid to 
undeclared employment. Efforts to tackle undeclared employment often involve a variety of 
ministries and measures can relate to taxation and business support as well as to measures 
that more obviously fall within the scope of labour administration. Although this section will 
place emphasis on those activities that are most clearly connected to labour administration, 
the informal economy is a policy issue that calls for joined-up activity across government 
and it therefore be necessary to consider connections between labour administration and 
other parts of the national public administration system. All of the themes discussed thus far 
in the report (particularly partnership, coordination and ICT) have implications for measures 
relating to the informal economy and this section therefore returns to them, focusing on those 
aspects that are most relevant to the informal economy.  
Governments have adopted a variety of strategies for dealing with the informal sector. While 
some of these approaches (e.g. detection and enforcement activities) are common, it should 
be emphasized that measures should be tailored to the specific conditions within the 
economy in question: there are no ‘off the peg’ solutions. Moreover, measures need to be 
considered in combination: no single policy can be expected to be effective in isolation. For 
example, the government of Sri Lanka has developed a strategy which involves, firstly, 
encouraging the growth of firms in sectors that add more value to the economy and, 
secondly, enhancing the employability of workers in more skilled, better paying occupations. 
Its plan involves a mix of entrepreneurship training, skills development programmes, and 
the provision of credit and business development services (Chandrasiri and Gunatilaka 2015: 
59). 
8.1 Legal definitions and coverage of regulations 
A prerequisite for the extension of labour administration to the informal economy is that 
work in the informal economy be conceptualised and captured in legal definitions. For EU 
member states, the European Commission’s definition of ‘undeclared work’ provides a 
common standard. The Commission defines undeclared work as any paid activities that are 
lawful as regards their nature but are not declared to the public authorities, taking into 
account differences in the regulatory systems of member states. Criminal activities fall 
outside of the scope of this definition. 
However, member states (and countries outside of the EU) have their own legal definitions 
of work in the informal economy. The Czech Republic, for example, defines illegal work as 
‘the performance of dependent work by a natural person not in employment or the 
performance of work by a foreign national in contravention of the issued work permit or 
without this permit or without a valid residence permit’ (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 
34). The definition was broadened with effect from 2012 to take into account illegal 
employment in the form of a de factor employment relation disguised by a different 
agreement (the so-called Švarc system).  In addition, the Labour Code was amended in 2011 
to make it unlawful for agreements on ‘work activity’ (short-term employment) to be 
concluded orally. The reason is that some employers had used oral agreements to disguise 
illegal work. It is now the case that all employment contracts must be concluded in writing 
(Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 36).  
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8.2 Registering employment contracts 
In an effort to reduce the extent of undeclared work, many countries have introduced new 
requirements relating to the registration of employees. Spain, for example, has a 
comprehensive approach to the registration of employments. Employers are required to 
maintain and keep up-to-date a Personnel Registration Book (in paper or electronic forms), 
in which all new employment must be recorded from the time when workers commence 
providing their services (Daza 2015: 72). All categories of employers and workers should 
be registered, including street vendors. 
In the Czech Republic, by contrast, there is no legislatively defined obligation to report 
agreements on the performance of work (i.e. employment relationships) to the Czech Social 
Security Administration. This means there is little to prevent the practice where documents 
confirming the conclusion of an employment relation are created only when an inspection 
takes place (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 38). 
8.3 Licensing 
Labour market intermediaries, such as employment agencies, can pose particular difficulties 
in relation to the informal economy. Agency employment has been a particular focus in the 
Czech Republic, where it has been associated with an increase in illegal work by foreign 
nationals. In the Czech Republic, any organization that mediates employment must have a 
licence. However, some entities continue to operate without a licence, engaging in ‘disguised 
mediation of employment’, which is illegal. For example, they may try to conclude a 
‘commercial legal relation’ between two ‘employers’ as a way of disguising a de facto 
employment relationship. According to Lehmann and Kyzlinková (2015: 36) this practice is 
often an attempt to get round the obligation to comply with requirements relating to equal 
working and pay conditions. 
Since January 2012, employment agencies have been banned from employing and supplying 
to their clients third-country nationals who do not have permanent residence. The conditions 
for obtaining a licence have also been tightened. Now both the MoLSA and the Ministry of 
Interior have a say in the awarding of licences (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 36). 
The UK provides a further example of an approach to licencing focused on labour market 
intermediaries. The Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA), which was established in 
2006 In the UK the GLA issues licences to labour suppliers in the agricultural, shellfish and 
food processing and packaging sectors. All labour suppliers operating in these sectors, from 
established employment agencies to individual ‘gangmasters’ are required to apply for a 
license. Successful applicants have to satisfy a number of licensing standards, examples of 
which include having appropriate systems for the collection of tax and national insurance 
(social security) contributions, paying wages that are no lower than the NMW, employing 
only those who are legally entitled to work in the UK, no ‘bonded debt’ and adherence to 
health and safety requirements. However, numerous sectors and occupations, including 
warehousing, cleaning, hospitality and catering, healthcare, office workers, factory work and 




Example 8: The licensing standards of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, UK 
The GLA licensing team is responsible for making decisions on new and existing licenses. The team checks 
that the labour supplier meets the conditions set out in the GLA’s Licensing Standards. The checks are based on 
information gathered during inspections, supplemented with information from government departments (e.g. 
HMRC) and enforcement agencies including the police. The licensing standards cover eight areas:  
• Fit and Proper Test 
• Pay and Tax matters 
• Prevention of Forced Labour and Mistreatment of Workers 
• Accommodation 
• Working conditions 
• Health and Safety 
• Recruiting Workers and Contractual Arrangements 
• Sub-Contracting and Using Other Labour Providers 
Each area is associated with a number of standards to which labour suppliers must comply. Points are 
attached to each standard. The number of points varies according to the GLA’s assessment of the relative 
importance of the standards. For example, withholding wages results in a score of 30 points, which is the highest 
number of points. A majority of standards are associated with a score of 8 points. In arriving at a licensing decision, 
the points associated with any standards that have not been met are added together. Any labour supplier who 
receives a score of 30 or more points will be refused a license. A supplier who scores less than 30 but who has 
failed to meet some standards can be granted a license but with ‘Additional License Conditions (ALCs)’ attached. 
The ALCs highlight the issues that need to be addressed within an agreed period of time. 
Source: Heyes and Hastings (2015) 
Spain provides an example of a country that has extended licensing requirements to street 
vendors. According to Law 7/1996 of 15 January, regulation of retail trade, street vendors 
must have a licence. Persons who engage in street vending must, in a manner easily visible 
to the public, display their personal details and the document attesting to the relevant 
municipal authorization, as well as an address for the receipt of possible complaints.  
8.4 Facilitating formalisation 
Spain has progressively simplified the process of formalisation. A process that had 
previously required entrepreneurs to seek permission to open establishments has been 
replaced by a simple declaration that a business is opening. Commencement of activities 
must be notified to the labour authorities of the Autonomous Community within 30 days. 
Companies, individual employers and self-employed workers register with the Social 
Security General Treasury by submitting an official form and documentation identifying the 
company. Employees must be declared using an official form of notification. Notifications 
can be made electronically, using an electronic document submission system, thus making 
it unnecessary for entrepreneurs to travel to Labour or Social Security Offices or post the 
forms (Daza 2015: 72). The Treasury of the Social Security has introduced several 
mechanisms to facilitate the monthly declaration of payroll and contributions. Using an 
internet-based ‘RED System’ (compulsory since 2010), employers submit documents 
(Payroll Reports); process balances owed, and pay contributions by direct debit or electronic 
payment (see Section 7). 
In Sri Lanka, several schemes have been implemented to help SMEs access finance. The key 
interventions include the Small and Medium Sector Development Project (2002-2007), 
Small and Medium Enterprise Regional Development Project (2008-2011), Small and 
Medium Enterprise Development Facility Project (2010-2015), New Comprehensive Rural 
Credit Scheme (1994- to date), Local Funded Projects, Investment Fund Account (IFA), and 
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SME Bank Branches. The total amount of loans granted under these schemes reached Rs. 
21,071 million by the end of 2013. Similarly, there have been various measures to support 
SMEs in relation to access to technology and tax-related concessions (Chandrasiri and 
Gunatilaka 2015: 62). 
The complexity of legal regulations may discourage growth of formal sector jobs, as in the 
case of Sri Lanka (Chandrasiri and Gunatilaka 2015: 63, 68). It is therefore important that 
employment law be as simple as possible to understand and implement. Employers also 
require access to reliable and authoritative information and advice in relation to the steps 
they need to take to ensure that they comply with their obligations under the law.  
8.5 Prevention through awareness raising 
Many workers, particularly migrant workers, can find themselves working informally simply 
because they do not have a firm understanding of their host country’s employment laws or 
do not have access to support, information and advice. In the Czech Republic, foreign 
nationals are informed in several key languages about labour law (this is done by SLIO and 
the Ministry of the Interior) and about possible pitfalls relating to unlicensed employment 
agencies (the Ministry of the Interior and NGOs take responsibility for this). NGOs and the 
Ministry of the Interior also work together to minimise human trafficking and forced labour 
via awareness-raising and other measures such as sheltered housing. The Office of the 
Government of the Czech Republic, through the Agency for Social Inclusion, strives to 
provide information about, and   prevent, illegal work in socially excluded localities (e.g. 
through campaigns, supporting the creation of subsidised jobs, intensive cooperation with 
employers, creating business plans for larger employers, honouring and advantaging 
employers in public procurement, introducing alternative remuneration methods etc.). 
Prevention also takes places at various levels of the education system, where SLIO 
representatives seek to draw students’ attention to the hazards and disadvantages of 
undeclared work (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 41). 
Due to the vast scale of the informal sector in India (which accounts for roughly 93 per cent 
of the total workforce; Sarkar 2015), the government has sought to improve the coverage of 
social insurance protection for those working in non-formal arrangements. One notable 
example is the State Assisted Scheme of Provident Fund for Unorganized Workers 
(SASPFUW), first implemented by the Labour Directorate in West Bengal via the Labour 
Department’s Resolution No. 180-IR (January, 2001) and Resolution No. 305-IR (February, 
2001). SASPFUW essentially offers an insurance scheme – subscriptions are available for 
Rs 25/ month, which are match-funded by the government – for those working across 46 
unorganized industries and 12 self-employed occupations. 11  Those eligible must be aged 
between 18 and 55 with a family income at or below 3,500 Rs/month.   
8.6 Reporting suspected violations 
Reactive inspection activities are triggered by the receipt of a complaint or expression of 
concern from workers, employers or concerned citizens. Typically, these complaints can be 
made to a telephone ‘helpline’. Some countries also make it possible for citizens to complete 
an on-line form. The UK has a single reporting form, which is available from www.Gov.uk 







gangmasters or working hours. Similarly, Ireland’s NERA has recently introduced a single 
complaint form.  
It is essential that the reporting process be made as straight-forward as possible. This is 
particularly necessary, given that workers in the informal economy are often migrants who 
may have an imperfect grasp of the native language and may therefore find the process of 
finding information particularly difficult.  
Example 9: Spain’s MBOX 
In 2012, Spain made available to all citizens an electronic mailbox (‘MBOX of the Struggle Against Labour 
Fraud’), which enables any person who knows of any breach of the rules relating to labour, social security or the 
prevention of risks, to provide information to the Labour and Social Security Inspectorate (ITSS), by filling out a 
form which is made available on the Ministry’s website. Workers can also confidentially report suspected 
fraudulent activity. As a result of information provided through this channel, 4,359 inspections were undertaken, 
resulting in the discovery of 1,097 undeclared jobs. 
Source: Daza (2015: 77, 79) 
8.7 Sanctions 
The use of sanctions in the form of fines and prosecutions is widespread. Sanctions can play 
an important role in deterring illegal activity and undeclared employment. If they are to act 
as a deterrent, the penalties must be sufficiently strong. Those who might be tempted to 
transgress must also believe that there is a reasonable chance that their activities might be 
detected. In the absence of an effective means of detecting illegal practices or undeclared 
employment, sanctions are relatively worthless. However, it is also important that sanctions 
be proportionate.     
The Czech Republic provides an example that illustrates the importance of these 
considerations. The Czech Republic significantly increased sanctions in 2012, mainly for 
employers making use of bogus self-employment (i.e. disguised employment relationships). 
In addition to fines, the tax offices can be expected to demand payment of calculated unpaid 
tax, including penalties and interest. The health and social insurance companies can be 
expected to do the same. However, it has been recognised that the authorities should be able 
to take into account the gravity of the wrongdoing and the firm’s wealth when determining 
the level of fines. In 2014, the lower limit for fines was abolished. The Constitutional Court 
pointed out that most cases present a low social risk and that the level of the minimum fine 
that was previously in place could wipe out a number of firms, a disproportionate punishment 
that would likely cause more harm than good. Consequently, administrative authorities can 
now set fines taking into account all the relevant circumstances (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 
2015: 43). 
The upper limit of fines can have a deterrent effect even for larger, more profitable firms. 
One problem that has become evident in practice, however, is the difficulty in collecting 
imposed fines. Most firms appeal against decisions and take legal action against the fines 




8.8 Labour inspection activities 
Labour inspectorates play a vital role in addressing issues relating to the informal economy. 
The most fundamental requirement is the existence of a labour inspectorate that is well 
supported and adequately resourced.  
Ireland provides an example of a labour inspectorate that is insufficiently resourced. In 2008, 
Ireland created a National Employment Regulation Authority (NERA) to strengthen 
inspection and enforcement powers and make other necessary provisions to secure 
compliance with employment law generally. NERA was formed in response to heightened 
pressure for state action to address illegal working practice NERA was initially intended to 
employ 90 inspectors. However, the imposition of austerity meant that the number only 
reached 84 (in 2008/2009) and then fell to 56 by 2015. Austerity has therefore negatively 
affected the capacity of NERA to respond to illegal activities and further the compliance 
agenda Staffing cuts have led to ‘agent swapping’ between regions, in order to facilitate 
inspections in regions that are particularly under-resources. Given the constraints on its 
capacity to inspect and prosecute, NERA has focused on education and awareness raising in 
relation to employers’ obligations under the law. Information is provided via a call centre 
information service (Hastings and Heyes 2015). 
The Czech Republic, by contrast, has been developing the capacity of its labour inspection 
service. It recently transferred responsibilities for illegal employment inspection and 
checking compliance with the regulations on work by foreign nationals from the LO CR to 
the State Labour Inspection Office (SLIO). This has enabled the LO CR to focus on 
employment services and has also resulted in an improvement in legal awareness among 
employers and workers. All of the SLIO’s inspectors who specialize in illegal employment 
are funded via a European Social Fund project. Thanks to the project finances, inspectors 
specializing in illegal employment have been equipped with mobile offices (a total of 180 
motor vehicles and the necessary technology (i.e. a laptop, printer, scanner, remote internet 
connection and GPS). Funding for training and re-training of employees was set aside under 
the project. While the project is due to finish in September in 2015, it is anticipated that the 
existing staff base will be maintained and will be funded by the MoLSA (Lehmann and 
Kyzlinková 2015: 41). 
Germany too has developed its capacity over time. A special customs unit, the Financial 
Monitoring Unit was founded in 2004 when a new law to combat illegal employment come 
into force (Weishaupt 2015). Customs units are part of the Federal Finance Administration 
(FFA), in charge of administrating and enforcing federal taxes and associated tax laws. The 
(in 2014) approximately 6500 FKS officers are specially trained civil servants. They are 
responsible for identifying illegal employment practices. Since 2015 they have also been 
empowered to enforce compliance with minimum wages. The law to combat illegal 
employment grants the FKS the right to inspect firms, review firm documents and talk to 
employees and contracted workers. If the FKS suspects irregular activities, legal proceedings 
can be initiated. The FKS acts ‘on demand’ (i.e. in response to concerns raised by a worker, 
employer etc.) and also on its own initiative, basing its proactive work on statistical ‘risk 
assessments’.  
It is also vital that there be a clear methodology for inspection. SLIO inspectors in the Czech 
Republic follow a recently introduced methodology for inspections of illegal employment. 
The methodology, which represents an attempt to establish ‘best practice’, contains a 
detailed description of the three fundamental inspection phases: preparation; the need to 
properly document and demonstrate the inspection findings; and closing the inspection 
record and the result of the inspection. One reason for making the change in inspection 
methodology was that inspection work had previously been very unevenly spread between 
regions, in terms of both the number, structure and focus of inspections and the results as 
expressed in the size of fines. The repeated targeting of certain entities was a particular 
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problem in this context. The new methodology therefore places greater emphasis on 
coordinating activities and a more balanced selection of inspection targets. Regular annual 
assessments of the application of the methodology and subsequent modifications are 
envisaged (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 42). 
The SLIO has also introduced a new information system to support its new methodology for 
inspection work. The new information system is intended to result in inspection records that 
are clearer and easier to complete. It should make it possible to generate selected inspection 
statistics that are compatible with generally used metrics (e.g. size of establishment, sector). 
This had not previously been possible (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 36; 42).  
In Spain, it has been a common practice to organize every year inspection campaigns focused 
on sectors and regions, such as hotels, bars and restaurants in coastal touristic zones in 
summer time; footwear apparel production; and construction in all regions. Nevertheless, 
unions and politicians have expressed concerns about the efficacy of ordinary or periodically 
conducted actions, asking for further better-organized mechanisms to combat irregular 
employment (Daza 2015: 75). 
A further requirement is the existence of adequate information sources. Ensuring adequate 
information will often require cooperation with other bodies within the national labour 
administration system. Sri Lanka’s Department of Labour updates its list of establishments 
based on information supplied by labour officers as and when they either find new 
enterprises when visiting old ones in the vicinity, or else when the ones they go to inspect 
are found to be no longer in existence. There is at present, however, no mechanism by which 
the list of establishments is updated according to the information available in other 
government institutions, such as the Registrar of Companies, the Department of Inland 
Revenue, or the Department of Census and Statistics. Therefore, the list of establishments 
maintained by the DoL which is used for inspections by labour officers, represents a 
(probably unrepresentative) fraction of the entire population of establishments covered under 
the regulations. Moreover, none of the listings of establishments corresponds to the zones or 
districts covered by each Labour Office. This also makes it difficult to carry out inspections 
efficiently (Chandrasiri and Gunatilaka 2015: 15). Furthermore, the inspections database is 
not based on a standard database management system and as a consequence the data cannot 
be easily accessed and used with standard statistical packages. Nor is the database linked 
with any of the other database systems maintained by the Department of Labour or any 
outside organization. Thus the existing database management system does not facilitate 
analysis of data, and as a result, there is no analysis in inspection reports, particularly in 
relation to reasons for non-compliance (Chandrasiri and Gunatilaka 2015: 49). The 
introduction of LISA may lead to these problems being addressed (see Section 7) although 
obstacles remain at the present time (Chandrasiri and Gunatilaka 2015: 51). 
8.9 Coordination and cooperation 
The informal economy is an area where collaborative relationships are particularly 
important. In addition to issues relating to labour standards, the informal economy has 
implications for government bodies with responsibility for the collection of tax and social 
security (e.g. Tax inspectorate) contributions and, to the extent that migrant workers are 
frequently engaged in informal work, the regulation of cross-border labour flows (e.g. 
Ministry of the Interior). Given that work in the informal economy can also be associated 
with illegal practices, the police force may also be involved. 
There are many examples of cooperation in practice. In the US, the WHD has worked with 
the joint USDOL-U.S. Department of Treasury initiative ‘to detect and deter the 
misclassification of employees as independent contractors and to strengthen and coordinate 
federal and state efforts to enforce labor violations arising from misclassification’, a situation 
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which precludes workers from receiving their rightful benefits under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act. The initiative has been conducted 
jointly because such misclassification also leads to large losses in the form of taxes not paid 
to the Treasury, Social Security, Medicare and Unemployment Insurance programs 
(Heinrich and King 2015: 44).   
The UK provides a further example. The GLA often has to act in concert with other 
government bodies. For example, there have been cases of labour suppliers being involved 
in VAT fraud, which has resulted in the GLA working closely with HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC, the tax authority) and the police. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) exist 
between the GLA and the bodies with which it needs to cooperate. For example, if the GLA 
believes it needs to work with the police force of pa particular locality, it has an agreement 
with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) that facilitates communication 
between the GLA’s intelligence section and the intelligence bureau of the police force in 
question. In cases where another body (e.g. the police or tax authorities) identify an issue 
that appear to have relevance to the GLA, information should be passed to the GLA’s 
intelligence unit. The intelligence unit will put the item on the agenda for the fortnightly 
tasking and co-ordination meeting, which is attended by the operational heads, the chief 
executive, the director of strategy, the deputy director of strategy (business development) 
and the crime manager. These individuals review progress on current cases and identify, 
allocate and decide on the appropriate course of action on particular new cases. However, if 
a case arises that appears to be urgent, it will be dealt with on the day by whoever is available 
and prioritized (this is referred to as ‘hot tasking’). The GLA has a good relationship with 
HMRC and, in particular, the UK Human Trafficking Centre (HTC). If it comes across a 
health and safety related issue it will liaise with the HSE, although the overlap in activities 
is not substantial as the GLA’s remit extends beyond health and safety to encompass 
exploitation.  
In Germany, the German Social Security Office screens firms when they submit their payroll 
contributions for fraud or for not paying minimum wages. These auditing officers regularly 
review firms’ social security contributions, which in turn are based on wages. If fraudulent 
or incorrect behavior is detected, the Social Security Office contacts either the FKS (if there 
are suspected minimum wage violations) or the public prosecutors at Land (regional) level 
(if there are suspected public procurement violations). Similarly, when the FSK detects 
minimum wage violations, it informs the Land-level finance ministries, the regional finance 
administration, the Social Security Office and the respective trade licensing offices 
(Weishaupt 2015).  
In the Czech Republic, a number of government departments are involved in combating 
illegal employment (especially illegal employment of foreign nationals). Of particular 
importance, is the relaying of SLIO information about inspection results to the Labour 
Office, which can use this information to detect abuses of social support benefits, and the 
flow of information from the CSSA to the SLIO comprising information on employee 
registers. The LO CR also passes on information to the SLIO when it suspects illegal activity 
and its regional branches provide the SLIO with the identification details of employees 
posted to perform work in the territory of the CR and their employers in the CR. This 
information is necessary for ensuring compliance. Information is exchanged between the 
SLIO and the police and between the LO CR and the Ministry of the Interior (for example, 
the LO CR provides the MoI with information on employment mediation licences and fines 
imposed on employment mediation entities). Some inspections by the SLIO are performed 
in cooperation with the police, most notably the Foreigners Police Service, which will 
sometimes suggest premises that might be inspected. The MoLSA and its subordinate bodies 
also cooperate in respect of inspection work with institutions in the department of the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) (particularly the customs and tax offices). Again, this takes the 
form of information exchange and making suggestions for inspections. The Trades 
Licencing Authority of the Industry and Trade Department also plays a role in inspection 
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work and receives inspection suggestions from the SLIO. Cooperation with these various 
authorities is rated very positively. The effectiveness and speed of active cooperation is often 
largely based on informal cooperation by the responsible persons in each institution (e.g. 
‘help over the phone’ etc.). This approach is conditional on stable staffing, however 
(Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 40). The SLIO and RLIs also cooperate with the tax 
offices, trades licensing offices, registry courts and the Public Defender of Rights. 
Cooperation with these institutions is not highly developed, however, and takes place solely 
on a very formal level. The institutions do not have clearly defined powers and conflicts can 
arise during investigations (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 40). This points to the 
importance of having clearly delineated areas of responsibility. 
In Ireland, NERA inspectors participate in Joint Inspections on an ad hoc basis via Joint 
Inspections Unit (JIUs) which pool officers from NERA, Revenue and Social Protection.  
The Inspection Service are empowered to carry out employment rights compliance 
inspections with reference to a series of employment related Acts. NERA can draw on the 
social welfare database (overseen by the Department of Social Protection) and can also 
access the Revenue’s database (Hasting and Heyes 2015: 17). Joint inspections between the 
police and NERA officers have acted as a forum for knowledge sharing between the two 
bodies since 2009 when NERA officers were appointed to enforce the employment permits 
Act of 2006. Joint inspections have not avoided criticism, however, with NGO groups 
voicing concerns over police presence at inspections. Concerns in the main refer to the 
police’s priority to minimise illegal immigration over and above defending vulnerable 
segments of society from exploitation (Hasting and Heyes 2015: 18).   
The importance attached to close cooperation has led many countries to institute measures 
to place cooperation of a formal basis. For example, and as already mentioned above, the 
UK’s GLA has established Memoranda of Understanding with the other agencies with which 
is needs to collaborate. Spain provides an example of a country that has taken a number of 
steps to provide collaborative efforts with firm institutional foundations. In 2012 Spain 
approved a Plan for combating irregular employment and social security fraud, which 
established mechanisms of stable cooperation between the State Public Employment 
Service, the Wage Guarantee Fund, the National Institute of Social Security, the Social 
Institute of the Maritime Workers and the General Treasury of Social Security. Spain also 
created a Sub Director General of Inspection on Social Security, Irregular Economy and 
Immigration, with the functions of developing plans, programs, actions, research methods 
and protocols for the detection and prosecution of fraud and breaches in terms of social 
security, irregular economy and foreign workers, as well as the coordination of actions with 
other administrative bodies with competence in the field of immigration and with entities 
and services of the Social Security (Daza 2015: 76-77). 
Example 10: Collaboration agreements in Spain 
In Spain, collaboration of key agencies is ensured by a 1997 Act (article 10 of Act 42/1997), which requires 
any organization that performs a public function to provide the Labour and Social Security Inspection service all 
relevant data, reports and background information that it requires and to collaborate in relation to inspection 
activities. The Labour and Social Security Inspection Service is required to reciprocate. Recently, however, 
collaboration has been formalised through signing of agreements.  The Directorate General of Labour and Social 
Security Inspection and the Social Security Treasury, signed a Joint Statement for the eradication of ‘shell 
companies’, which are established solely to facilitate access to various allowances, benefits and residence 
permits.  
A subsequent agreement, signed in 2013 by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Security, promotes coordination between the Labour Inspectorate, the State Security and Police Forces. 
Joint actions increased by 30% in the year the agreement was signed. 
A further agreement enables the Labour and Social Security Inspection service to request from the College 
of Registrars information relating to any company listed in its records (Daza 2015: 77-78, 79).  
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In 2015 plans were made for a new National Office for the Fight against Fraud. This body 
will be located within the new Autonomous Agency of Labour and Social Security 
Inspection and will comprise all of the agencies involved in the fight against fraud. It will 
be responsible for the detection of fraud, the programming and implementation of inspection 
activities and evaluation of results. The new National Office will also serve as a liaison with 
the ‘European Platform against undeclared work’ (Daza 2015).  
Spain’s new initiative is intended to focus efforts and ensure that agencies’ activities are 
aligned. There are other mechanism, that may serve to help improve alignment and inform 
actions in relation to the informal economy. The following illustrations represent examples 
of regular fora established to address particular issues relating to the informal economy:  
i. The US’s WHD is engaged in efforts (along with the Office of the Secretary, the 
Solicitor’s Office, the Office of Public Affairs, and the Employment and Training 
Administration in the USDOL) to address Questionable Employment Tax Practices 
(QETP). It is part of a QETP Oversight Team that seeks ‘to promote information sharing 
initiatives’ between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and State QETP members and 
participants. The broad-based QETP Oversight Team also includes representatives from 
the IRS, the not-for-profit National Association of State Workforce Agencies 
(NASWA), and state unemployment insurance trust funds (Heinrich and King 2015: 
44).   
ii. In the Czech Republic the SLIO is a member of several interdepartmental commissions 
and working groups. These include the Interdepartmental Body for Combating Illegal 
Employment of Foreigners (IBCIEF), 12  the Government Council for Occupational 
Safety and Health Protection, the Analytical Centre for the Protection of the State 
Borders and Migration (ACPSBM) 13 etc. Within these groups, there is cooperation 
between the departments, the non-profit sector and other entities (Lehmann and 
Kyzlinková 2015: 39). 
iii.  Ireland has established a Hidden Economy Monitoring Group (HEMG). The group was 
established in 1990 and represents a collaboration between the Office of the Revenue 
Commissioners, the Department of Social and Family Affairs, NERA, ICTU, IBEC, the 
Small Firms’ Association (SFA) and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF). Since 
its creation, the HEMG has undergone internal reviews aimed at enhancing its 
effectiveness. The social partners actively collaborate at both national and regional 
levels in the HEMG.  
  
 
12 Interdepartmental coordinating bodies are set up to deal with longer-term problems, such as illegal 
work. The IBCIEF was set up under the MoLSA, and the SLIO cooperates with the Office of the 
Government through it. 
13  The ACPSBM deals with residence issues linked to the employment of foreign nationals, including 
the abuse of residence to perform illegal employment 
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Example 1: Hidden Economy Monitoring Group (HEMG) in Ireland 
Objectives 
The central remit of the HEMG is to encourage better compliance with legal requirements, if necessary 
through increased enforcement.  The terms of reference are ‘to provide a forum for the exchange of views on the 
effectiveness of measures introduced in combating the “black economy” between the Revenue Commissioners 
and Department of Social and Family Affairs and representatives of employers, trade unions and the construction 
industry’.   
Examples of achievements of the HEMG: 
 Its initial achievement following its launch in 2007 was to sponsor legislation providing for the exchange 
of employment information on the earned income of individuals between the Department of Jobs, 
Enterprise and Innovation, the Department of Social Protection and Revenue.   
 The production of an updated ‘Code of Practice for Determining Employment or Self-Employment 
Status of Individuals’ issued to all principal employers and sub-contractors in a total of 15 languages. 
 New procedures to strengthen the employment vs. self-employment distinction in the construction, 
forestry and meat processing sectors 
Source: Hastings and Heyes (205: 19) 
8.10 Data sharing 
The ability to share data is essential if cooperation between bodies is to be effective. 
Problems can occur where databases are not shared. For example, in Sri Lanka, the MLLR 
and DoL maintain three database systems without using an integrated system of information 
sharing (Chandrasiri and Gunatilaka 2015: 48). Furthermore, labour inspectors in Sri Lanka 
manually record labour inspection data. This can result in delays, inaccuracies, and 
information that is difficult to analyse and use for planning and performance management 
purposes. It can also result in information that cannot be effectively shared with other bodies 
and reports that can be excessively time-consuming to process (Chandrasiri, and Gunatilaka 
2015: 19). 
Several countries have taken steps to improve their ability to share data. For example:  
i. In the Czech Republic, an interconnected information system for the SLIO, LO CR and 
CSSA has been in place since 2015, giving staff of one institution direct access to 
relevant data from the other institutions’ databases. The creation of the shared electronic 
register, which is accessible via remote access, has substantially improved 
communication between the various bodies. Labour inspectors regard it as a 
fundamental step to ensure more effective work. The law also now permits the transfer 
of selected information from the police and the interior ministry to the MoLSA and its 
organizational components (SLIO, RLIs, LO CR) (Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 36; 
40).  
ii. In Germany, cooperation between the FKS and the DRV has included the development 
of access to a joint database and information platform (also when by mobile FKS 
officers through remote access), which has proved to be highly effective in fraud 
detection and law enforcement (Lubinski, 2013; cited in Weishaupt 2015). 
iii.  In Ireland, the Revenue section of the Department of Finance has promoted an approach 
to data sharing in cooperation with other authorities including the Department of Social 
Protection (DSP) and the National Employment Regulation Authority.  This 
consultation process is designed to identify non-declared and under-declared incomes, 
fraudulent DSP clams and related non-compliance issues. A High Level Revenue/DSP 
Liaison Group strives to maintain this cooperation, and conducts meetings on a 
quarterly basis. The aim is to enhance the scope and depth of the data exchange between 
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DSP and Revenue. (Hastings and Heyes 2015: 15). Ireland is also considering the 
development of a National Data Infrastructure to support evidence-based policy making 
and evaluation (Hastings and Heyes 2015: 16).  
iv. Also in Ireland, laptops have been replaced by iPads to help inspectors to access 
databases whilst operating in the field. The iPads are also used as navigational tools to 
help inspectors find premises (Hastings and Heyes 2015: 20).   
v. In Spain, under a Collaboration Agreement between the College of Registrars of Spain 
and the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, the Labour and Social Security 
Inspection service may request access to data relating to particular companies, which 
can help them to identify potential cases of non- or under-payment of social 
contributions. 
vi. In the UK, the DWP receives a ‘real time information’ (RTI) feed from HMRC. This 
allows HMRC and DWP to synchronise their systems in order to determine whether 
people are receiving income from the state. The RTI might show that someone is 
claiming benefit when the DWP’s systems show that they are not.  
Example 12: Examples of data-sharing in Ireland 
(i) In 2009, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Revenue Commissioners and the 
Central Statistics Office (which conducts statutory surveys of Irish businesses) to allow for the exchange of 
business data. This data-sharing arrangement reduced the need to survey businesses directly, while 
generating statistics in support of evidence based policy making.  
(ii) The Department of Social Protection, in conjunction with the Revenue Commissioners, developed data 
exchanges to enhance the detection of fraud and control compliance. The legislative basis for the exchange 
of information is contained in Section 261 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. In one such 
exchange, information was provided by Revenue on persons who had received large amounts of interest 
on investments made. This data was matched with Department of Social Protection records to identify 
individuals who had failed to disclose large personal investments when applying for welfare payments. As 
a direct result of this data-sharing, millions of Euro in overpayments have been recovered. 
(iii) A Memorandum of Understanding is in place between NERA and the Health and Safety Authority (HAS).   
(iv) NERA is in the in process of developing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Gangmasters Licensing 
Authority in Northern Ireland. At the present time, exchange of information remains informal and ad hoc. 
Source: Hastings and Heyes 2015: 17-18 
8.11 Cross-border collaboration 
Many of those who work in the informal economy are migrant workers. Some work in the 
informal sector of their own volition while others are victims of trafficking and forced 
labour. Cross-border flows, which may be facilitated by labour market intermediaries such 
as employment agencies, imply a need for cross-border cooperation involving labour 
ministries and labour inspectorates in different countries. Several countries have taken steps 
to develop such cooperation. In the Czech Republic, for example, close cooperation in 
relation to measures to tackle illegal employment takes place with bodies in neighbouring 
countries (e.g. the National Labour Inspectorate of Slovakia, the Bavarian Chamber of 
Commerce). 
A Memorandum of Understanding exists between the UK and Irish Governments regarding 
matters of mutual interest in areas of social security fraud. The Memorandum of 
Understanding is supplemented by the Cross-Border Operational Forum, which comprises 
senior fraud managers from the Republic of Ireland and the UK. The Forum’s modus 
operandi is to ensure effective cooperation at an operational level to prevent/detect fraud 
between the three jurisdictions (Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain).  This involves 
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case data-matching to identify cases with the potential for social welfare fraud/abuse.  The 
respective ministries with responsibility for social benefits conduct checks on each other’s 
behalf (Hastings and Heyes 2015: 20). 
In the UK, the GLA is developing connections with labour inspectorates in other EU 
countries. The GLA informs overseas labour inspectorates of licences they have issued to 
labour suppliers from those countries. In some cases, for example, Lithuania, the labour 
inspectorate in the ‘sending’ country has carried out inspections on behalf of the GLA 
(Heyes and Hastings 2015).  
8.12 Trends and lessons learned 
The vulnerability of those who work in the informal economy and the widespread failure of 
employers to respect national labour laws and treat their workers decently mean that the 
informal economy is an important issue for labour administration.   
Clearly the adequacy of the funding that governments provide to labour inspectorates is an 
extremely important influence on their ability to address problems associated with 
employment in the informal economy. Inadequate funding will result in inadequate staffing 
and other resources, such as information and communications technology. In many 
developing or transitional economies the informal economy is the main source of 
employment, which can mean that the resources available to labour inspection services are 
dwarfed by the scale of the problem that confronts them. This can encourage a focus on the 
formal sector, which might be further reinforced by performance targets that inspectorates 
and individual inspectors are required to meet and against which their performance is 
evaluated. Quite simply, it is easier to conduct inspections, detect non-compliance and 
enforce labour legislation in formal sector enterprises than in informal sector enterprises. 
Inspection in relation to the latter is hampered by the low visibility and sometimes peripatetic 
nature of informal businesses and also by a lack of evidence about the scale, characteristics 
and distribution of informal businesses and undeclared employment by formal sector 
enterprises. It is therefore vital that labour ministries and labour inspectorates seek to gather 
this information, even though its accuracy may be limited.  
The effectiveness of labour inspectorates also depends on their mandate. In some countries 
the mandate of the main labour inspection service is oriented towards health and safety while 
in others it is more encompassing.  Some countries have formed specialised units or teams 
that focus solely on the informal economy. The degree of success is also likely to depend on 
the strategies that are pursued. Traditionally the focus of inspection activity has been on 
enforcement and compliance. While this remains important, there are other approaches to 
regulation, such as preventative and awareness-raising activities, that might be used 
alongside traditional methods.  
It is important to recognise that labour inspectorates cannot be expected to tackle informal 
economy problems on their own. The informal economy has implications for policy and 
administration in respect of employment, social security, health and safety, migration, 
education, employment relations and macroeconomic policy. Responsibilities for these 
different areas are typically distributed across a number of government ministries and 
agencies. Governments must find ways of joining-up the activities of the various ministries 
and agencies so as to ensure coordination of actions, coherence of policies and sharing of 
information. Data sharing should not be ad-hoc but should be a normal activity that may 
require formal understandings between different government departments. Several countries 
have moved towards having shared databases, that can be accessed by all ministries and 




Effective labour market regulation requires a national system of labour administration that 
is well organized, well-resourced and well managed. The achievement of economic and 
social objectives, such as tackling unemployment, upholding labour standards, reducing 
inequality and promoting social cohesion depends not only on good policies but also on good 
governance and appropriate institutions. However, in many countries labour ministries and 
associated agencies are under increasing pressure as a consequence of cuts in the resources, 
or increases in their responsibilities without a commensurate expansion in their capacity. 
This has further underlined the need for good management, robust procedures and an ability 
to demonstrate effectiveness. 
There can be no blueprint for the organization of national labour administration systems. 
They will differ depending on factors such as the size of the country, whether it is a federal 
or unitary system, the capacity of the social partners and the financial resources available to 
the government. However, this report has discussed a number of issues that are likely to 
affect all labour administration systems and has identified a number of lessons that point to 
how the effectiveness of labour administration might be strengthened.   
Planning is at the heart of any system of labour administration, encompassing the 
development and implementation of the government’s policy agenda and the specific 
programmes, actions and timescales of ministries and agencies. Plans needs to be regularly 
reviewed and informed by performance data and data relating to the labour market. The 
quality of plans is likely to be directly influenced by the quality of the data that inform them.  
Reliable means of ensuring ongoing coordination of activities are also essential. While 
labour ministries obviously bear primary responsibility for labour and employment issues, 
other ministries may also have an interest or may have responsibility for issues (such as 
education, welfare, or the economy) that have implications for labour-related matters. Inter-
ministerial coordination is therefore required, which may be facilitated by cross-
departmental coordination committees and a requirement that all departments be given an 
opportunity to comment on new policy proposals. Horizontal coordination is also needed 
within ministries, to ensure that civil servants to not work in silos and have an understanding 
of the objectives of different parts of the ministry. Effective vertical coordination is also 
important. Devolution of service delivery responsibility to semi-autonomous agencies and 
decentralisation of service delivery to local bodies can encourage greater flexibility and 
attention to local circumstances, but potentially weakens the ability of ministries to control 
and coordinate activities. As far as possible, mechanisms of vertical coordination need to 
ensure transparency and accountability, but minimise bureaucracy.  
The report has also demonstrated that there are various approaches to performance 
management and different management systems designed to maximise productivity, 
transparency and accountability within labour administration. Performance indicators are 
commonly used at different levels (i.e. individual departmental, organizational) within 
national systems of labour administration, although approaches to target setting vary (e.g. 
targets may be orientated to achieving overall outcomes rather than the accumulation of 
micro-targets). In the post-crisis era several governments have faced questions over whether 
to adjust performance management systems and targets in response to budgetary constraints.  
In some cases workload intensification has resulted where budgets have been cut or frozen 
without an adjustment of targets. 
The evidence suggests that partnerships continue to play an important role in increasing the 
effectiveness of labour administration. The impact of partnerships often depends on their 
coverage and the willingness of public authorities to engage and secure collaboration with 
stakeholders. In countries which have a strong tradition of social partnership, tripartite 
arrangements commonly play a role in the governance of labour administration bodies across 
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a range of administrative areas. Conversely, in other countries with less well-established 
traditions of social partnership, collaboration with unions and employer organizations may 
take place on a more ad hoc basis. Cooperation with NGOs can also be beneficial (e.g. with 
charities and third sector organizations that have an interest in vulnerable workers), while 
the involvement of the private sector has become common, particularly in relation to 
employment services. Governments face an important decision when deciding which 
services may be adequately outsourced to private or third-sector sector providers, and which 
provisions should remain ‘in-house’. Contracts with service providers need to be clear, 
ensure transparency and accountability and commit providers to ensuring that their services 
are of a high quality and are available to all who are eligible to receive them (Koeltz 2013).  
The use of private service providers is also common in relation to the implementation of ICT 
reforms aimed at improving the accessibility, transparency and efficiency of services. New 
technologies have the potential to benefit numerous labour administration activities, such as 
the administration of benefits, the registration of unemployed workers, labour inspection 
(the development of mobile technology and tablet software) and management functions (for 
example, online Human Resource Management systems). However, several challenges 
remain. Cost can be a substantial problem as ICT expenditure can be difficult to predict, and 
this risk is not necessarily mitigated by the use of third party suppliers. A phased approach 
to implementation can help to ensure adequate training of staff and transfer of knowledge 
from the supplier to the ministry.   
In many ways efforts to tackle the informal economy highlight the importance of all of the 
other issues discussed in this report. Although labour ministries and labour inspectorates 
may have primary responsibility for improving the enforcement of employment rights in the 
informal economy, other ministries and agencies also have an interest in improving 
regulation of the informal economy and there is much that might be achieved by different 
ministries and agencies cooperating and coordinating their activities. For this to happen, 
there must be clear understandings, open lines of communication and shared access to data. 
Local authorities and social partners can also play important roles in disseminating 
information and detecting non-compliance with labour legislation, which again underlines 
the potential importance of partnerships. ICT is also important, as it has the potential to 
improve data storage and the accessibility of data, which can help in the identification of 
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